Benchmarking the Effect of Poisoning Defenses on the Security and Bias of Deep Learning Models

N. Baracaldo, Farhan Ahmed, Kevin Eykholt, Yi Zhou, Shriti Priya, Taesung Lee, S. Kadhe, Mike Tan, Sridevi Polavaram, Sterling Suggs, Yuyang Gao, David Slater
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Abstract

Machine learning models are susceptible to a class of attacks known as adversarial poisoning where an adversary can maliciously manipulate training data to hinder model performance or, more concerningly, insert backdoors to exploit at inference time. Many methods have been proposed to defend against adversarial poisoning by either identifying the poisoned samples to facilitate removal or developing poison agnostic training algorithms. Although effective, these proposed approaches can have unintended consequences on the model, such as worsening performance on certain data sub-populations, thus inducing a classification bias. In this work, we evaluate several adversarial poisoning defenses. In addition to traditional security metrics, i.e., robustness to poisoned samples, we also adapt a fairness metric to measure the potential undesirable discrimination of sub-populations resulting from using these defenses. Our investigation highlights that many of the evaluated defenses trade decision fairness to achieve higher adversarial poisoning robustness. Given these results, we recommend our proposed metric to be part of standard evaluations of machine learning defenses.
对中毒防御对深度学习模型安全性和偏差的影响进行基准测试
机器学习模型容易受到一类被称为对抗性中毒的攻击,在这种攻击中,攻击者可以恶意操纵训练数据来阻碍模型的性能,或者更关心的是,在推理时插入后门来利用。已经提出了许多方法来防御对抗性中毒,通过识别中毒样本以方便去除或开发毒素不可知论训练算法。虽然这些建议的方法是有效的,但可能会对模型产生意想不到的后果,例如在某些数据子群上的性能恶化,从而导致分类偏差。在这项工作中,我们评估了几种对抗性中毒防御。除了传统的安全指标(即对中毒样本的鲁棒性)之外,我们还采用了一个公平指标来衡量使用这些防御措施对子种群的潜在不良歧视。我们的调查强调,许多评估防御交易决策公平,以实现更高的对抗性中毒鲁棒性。鉴于这些结果,我们建议将我们提出的指标作为机器学习防御标准评估的一部分。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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