Wittgenstein’s Criticism of the “Atmosphere” Conception of Meaningin PI § 117

Abstract

Abstract: In recent years, so-called “therapeutic” readings of the later Wittgenstein have centered on the claim that his treatment of questions involving “meaning” should not be seen as playing a foundational role for his approach of treating philosophical problems by clarifying the grammar of expressions. As they argue, the treatment of problems involving “meaning” should not be seen as playing a special role for this approach as such. Now in Philosophical Investigations §117, Wittgenstein is bringing in his criticism of the “atmosphere” conception of meaning – which he links directly to his approach of clarifying the grammar of expressions figuring in philosophical problems. Assuming the widespread view that what should be pitted against this “atmosphere” conception are remarks clarifying the grammar of “meaning”, the problem apparently confronting therapeutic readings here is that the clarification of the grammar of this particular word might thus appear to assume yet a special relevance for Wittgenstein’s clarificatory approach as a whole. My aim in this paper is to show that this dilemma is not a real one – by showing that there is actually a problem with the view that remarks clarifying the grammar of “meaning” could play a privileged role in debunking the type of misconception Wittgenstein introduces in PI § 117.