Board Meeting Frequencies on Various Topics and Corporate Governance: Evidence from China

Jiao Ji, Oleksandr Talavera, Shuxing Yin
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Abstract

The paper examines the relationship between numbers of topic-specific board meetings and quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate governance is estimated by CEO turnover-performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. Information about topic-specific meetings is collected from the reports of independent directors in Chinese listed firms over the period of 2005 to 2015. We document that more frequent discussions of growth strategies for the use of IPO proceeds, investment and acquisitions increase the CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. However, more discussions about the nomination of directors and top management are likely to reduce the sensitivities of CEO turnover and compensation to performance. Our findings shed light on what makes boards more efficient, and how board monitoring on assorted decisions modifies the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.
不同议题的董事会会议频率与公司治理:来自中国的证据
本文考察了特定主题董事会会议次数与公司治理质量之间的关系。公司治理质量通过CEO离职-绩效和薪酬-绩效敏感性来衡量。专题会议信息收集自2005 - 2015年中国上市公司独立董事报告。我们发现,对IPO收益、投资和收购使用增长战略的讨论越频繁,CEO薪酬绩效敏感性就越高。然而,更多关于董事提名和高层管理的讨论可能会降低CEO离职和薪酬对业绩的敏感性。我们的研究结果揭示了是什么让董事会更有效率,以及董事会对各种决策的监督如何改变CEO利益与公司绩效之间的关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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