Taxing Nudges

K. Thomas
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Abstract

Governments are increasingly turning to behavioral economics to inform policy design in areas like health care, the environment, and financial decision-making. Research shows that small behavioral interventions, referred to as “nudges,” often produce significant responses at a low cost. The theory behind nudges is that, rather than mandating certain behaviors or providing costly economic subsidies, modest initiatives may “nudge” individuals to choose desirable outcomes by appealing to their behavioral preferences. For example, automatically enrolling workers into savings plans as a default rather than requiring them to actively sign up has dramatically increased enrollment in such plans. Similarly, allowing individuals to earn “wellness points” from attendance at a gym, redeemable at various retail establishments, may improve exercise habits.

A successful nudge should make a desired choice as simple and painless as possible. Yet one source of friction may counteract an otherwise well-designed nudge: taxation. Under current tax laws, certain incentives designed to nudge behavior are treated as taxable income. At best, people are ignorant of taxes on nudges, an outcome that is not good for the tax system. At worst, taxes on nudges may actively deter people from participating in programs with worthy policy goals. To date, policymakers have generally failed to account for this potential obstacle in designing nudges.

This Article sheds light on the tax treatment of nudges and the policy implications of taxing them. It describes the emergence of a disjointed tax regime that exempts private-party nudges but taxes identical incentives that come from the government. What’s more, an incentive structured as a government grant may be taxable while an economically identical tax credit is not. The Article then proposes reforms that would unify the tax treatment of nudges and enhance their effectiveness. Specifically, lawmakers should reverse the default rule that all government transfers are taxable, and instead exclude government transfers from income unless otherwise provided by the Tax Code.
推动征税
政府越来越多地转向行为经济学,为卫生保健、环境和金融决策等领域的政策设计提供信息。研究表明,小的行为干预,被称为“轻推”,往往以低成本产生显著的反应。推动背后的理论是,适度的举措可能会通过吸引个人的行为偏好来“推动”个人选择理想的结果,而不是强制某些行为或提供昂贵的经济补贴。例如,将员工自动纳入储蓄计划作为默认设置,而不是要求他们主动注册,这极大地增加了此类计划的注册人数。同样,允许个人在健身房获得“健康积分”,并在各种零售场所兑换,可能会改善锻炼习惯。一个成功的推动应该使期望的选择尽可能简单和无痛。然而,摩擦的一个来源可能会抵消另一个精心设计的推动:税收。根据现行税法,某些旨在推动行为的激励措施被视为应纳税收入。往好了说,人们对“轻推”税一无所知,这种结果对税收制度不利。在最坏的情况下,对“助推”征税可能会积极阻止人们参与具有有价值的政策目标的项目。迄今为止,政策制定者在设计推动措施时,普遍未能考虑到这一潜在障碍。这篇文章揭示了轻推的税收待遇和征税的政策含义。它描述了一种脱节的税收制度的出现,这种制度免除了私人政党的推动,但对来自政府的相同激励征税。更重要的是,作为政府补助结构的激励可能要纳税,而经济上相同的税收抵免则不征税。文章随后提出改革建议,统一对“轻推”的税收处理,提高其有效性。具体来说,立法者应该改变所有政府转移支付都应纳税的默认规则,而是将政府转移支付从收入中排除,除非税法另有规定。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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