{"title":"A 'Double Coincidence' Search Model of Money","authors":"N. Amendola","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1162822","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), the double coincidence of wants problem seems to be not essential to rationalize the use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants. The existence of a monetary equilibrium depends, essentially, on the asymmetry in the role played by economic agents in the exchange and production processes. In particular, entrepreneurs are assumed to produce a fixed amount of a divisible consumption good by means of labour services provided by workers. Entrepreneurs can offer a co-operative (barter) contract or a monetary contract to workers. Under the co-operative contract real wages are determined in the labour exchange sector, while in the monetary regime real wages are determined in the commodity exchange sector. The monetary contract is proved to be an equilibrium strategy provided that: (i) the workers' labour disutility is sufficiently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs' bargaining power in the commodity market is sufficiently large relative to their bargaining power in the labour market. The rationale for money comes from the fact that entrepreneurs use it as an instrument to maximize their output share.","PeriodicalId":415756,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Other Labor Economics (Sub-Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERPN: Other Labor Economics (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1162822","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
According to Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), the double coincidence of wants problem seems to be not essential to rationalize the use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants. The existence of a monetary equilibrium depends, essentially, on the asymmetry in the role played by economic agents in the exchange and production processes. In particular, entrepreneurs are assumed to produce a fixed amount of a divisible consumption good by means of labour services provided by workers. Entrepreneurs can offer a co-operative (barter) contract or a monetary contract to workers. Under the co-operative contract real wages are determined in the labour exchange sector, while in the monetary regime real wages are determined in the commodity exchange sector. The monetary contract is proved to be an equilibrium strategy provided that: (i) the workers' labour disutility is sufficiently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs' bargaining power in the commodity market is sufficiently large relative to their bargaining power in the labour market. The rationale for money comes from the fact that entrepreneurs use it as an instrument to maximize their output share.
根据Engineer and Shi(1998, 2001)和Berentsen and Rocheteau(2003)的研究,在搜索理论框架中,需求问题的双重巧合似乎并不是使金钱使用合理化的必要条件。本文分析了存在普遍双重需求巧合的货币内生价格搜索模型。货币均衡的存在本质上取决于经济主体在交换和生产过程中所扮演角色的不对称性。特别是,企业家被假定通过工人提供的劳务生产固定数量的可分消费品。企业家可以向工人提供合作(物物交换)合同或货币合同。在合作社合同下,实际工资由劳动力交换部门决定,而在货币制度下,实际工资由商品交换部门决定。货币契约被证明是一种均衡策略,前提是:(i)工人的劳动负效用足够高和/或(ii)企业家在商品市场上的议价能力相对于他们在劳动力市场上的议价能力足够大。货币的基本原理来自于这样一个事实,即企业家把它作为一种工具来最大化他们的产出份额。