Agreement-Making Under Workchoices: The Impact of the Legal Framework on Bargaining Practices and Outcomes

C. Sutherland
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Overall, there must be considerable doubt that The Fairness Test will provide outcomes which are procedurally or substantively fair for employees.4. The emerging evidence of outcomes under workplace agreements confirms that the potential for the new framework to undermine the bargaining position of employees has been realised. Data on employer greenfields agreements strongly suggests that substantial numbers of employees have received no compensation for the removal of protected award conditions via these agreements. A combination of statistical and anecdotal evidence leads to a similar conclusion in relation to AWAs.5. In the case of collective agreements, the report highlights a number of templates which are being used to set the terms and conditions of employment for retail and hospitality workers. Following a reduction in the involvement of traditional third parties in agreement-making (ie, the AIRC and unions), these templates have been adopted (often without alteration) by many employers. The effect is to allow an alternative third party - the industrial relations consultant - to exercise significant influence over the content of agreements.6. The widespread replication of these templates in collective agreements in the retail and hospitality industries suggests that there is very little genuine bargaining taking place. A study of the templates themselves reveals the extent to which it is possible for an employer to reduce and remove employee benefits through the powerful mechanism of the Work Choices workplace agreement. The templates provide instances of the reduction of employee rights of control over hours of work, rostering, job location and job functions. The effect of these provisions is not only to displace conditions from awards and State legislation, but also to jeopardise the rights of an employee under his or her individual contract of employment.7. The report also highlights some of the problems which have arisen because of the removal of a certification or vetting process before agreements are approved. The existence of provisions in Agreement-Making under Work Choices III agreements which fall below the ‘safety net’, or which mislead employees about their legal entitlements, suggests that the new framework is failing to ensure compliance with the basic legal rules.8. The legal framework also appears to legitimate certain unfair employer bargaining practices by removing any positive requirement for employers to explain the effect of workplace agreements to employees, or to obtain genuine approval for these agreements, and by providing only weak protections against false or misleading conduct and duress. 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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Executive Summary:1. The Work Choices reforms substantially altered the rules for making agreements. This report identifies at least 15 ways in which the legal framework has shifted the balance of bargaining power away from employees.2. The introduction of a ‘Fairness Test’ purports to remedy the effects of just one of these changes: the removal of the ‘no disadvantage test’. It is clear that this single measure will be unable to address the multiple ways in which the framework undermines the bargaining position ofemployees.3. Contrary to the Government’s assertions, the Fairness Test is not, by any measure, stronger Than the former ‘no disadvantage test’ - the new test is clearly narrower in scope and provides fewer procedural protections than the former test. Overall, there must be considerable doubt that The Fairness Test will provide outcomes which are procedurally or substantively fair for employees.4. The emerging evidence of outcomes under workplace agreements confirms that the potential for the new framework to undermine the bargaining position of employees has been realised. Data on employer greenfields agreements strongly suggests that substantial numbers of employees have received no compensation for the removal of protected award conditions via these agreements. A combination of statistical and anecdotal evidence leads to a similar conclusion in relation to AWAs.5. In the case of collective agreements, the report highlights a number of templates which are being used to set the terms and conditions of employment for retail and hospitality workers. Following a reduction in the involvement of traditional third parties in agreement-making (ie, the AIRC and unions), these templates have been adopted (often without alteration) by many employers. The effect is to allow an alternative third party - the industrial relations consultant - to exercise significant influence over the content of agreements.6. The widespread replication of these templates in collective agreements in the retail and hospitality industries suggests that there is very little genuine bargaining taking place. A study of the templates themselves reveals the extent to which it is possible for an employer to reduce and remove employee benefits through the powerful mechanism of the Work Choices workplace agreement. The templates provide instances of the reduction of employee rights of control over hours of work, rostering, job location and job functions. The effect of these provisions is not only to displace conditions from awards and State legislation, but also to jeopardise the rights of an employee under his or her individual contract of employment.7. The report also highlights some of the problems which have arisen because of the removal of a certification or vetting process before agreements are approved. The existence of provisions in Agreement-Making under Work Choices III agreements which fall below the ‘safety net’, or which mislead employees about their legal entitlements, suggests that the new framework is failing to ensure compliance with the basic legal rules.8. The legal framework also appears to legitimate certain unfair employer bargaining practices by removing any positive requirement for employers to explain the effect of workplace agreements to employees, or to obtain genuine approval for these agreements, and by providing only weak protections against false or misleading conduct and duress. These unfair (but not unlawful) practices include: offering AWAs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to new employees; using employer greenfields agreements on new projects to set a low base of employment conditions and to create a union-free environment; and ‘starving out’ employees by holding back pay rises until the employees enter into AWAs.9. Perhaps emboldened by the environment created by Work Choices, some employers are engaging in unlawful bargaining practices, such as targeting employees who refuse to sign AWAs by reducing their shifts, or threatening to remove other employee benefits, or ending their employment.10. Fundamental changes, not stop-gap measures, are required to address the bargaining practices and agreement outcomes which are permitted, and to some extent encouraged, under the Work Choices framework. Without legislative reform to ensure genuine bargaining and compliance with the agreement-making rules, it is inevitable that the working conditions of vulnerable employees will be further diminished.
工作选择下的协议制定:法律框架对议价实践和结果的影响
执行概要:1。工作选择改革大大改变了签订协议的规则。本报告指出,法律框架至少从15个方面改变了雇员讨价还价的平衡。“公平测试”的引入旨在弥补其中一个变化的影响:取消“无劣势测试”。很明显,这一单一措施将无法解决该框架破坏员工议价地位的多种方式。与政府的说法相反,公平测试无论如何并不比以前的“无不利条件测试”更有效——新测试的范围显然更窄,提供的程序保障也比以前的测试少。总的来说,公平测试是否会为员工提供程序上或实质上公平的结果,这一点肯定存在相当大的疑问。有关工作场所协议成果的新证据证实,新框架削弱员工议价地位的可能性已经实现。关于雇主绿地协议的数据强烈表明,大量雇员没有通过这些协议获得取消受保护奖励条件的补偿。统计和轶事证据的结合得出了关于awas的类似结论。就集体协议而言,报告强调了一些用于确定零售和接待工作人员就业条款和条件的模板。随着传统第三方(如AIRC和工会)参与协议制定的减少,这些模板已被许多雇主采用(通常不加修改)。其结果是允许另一个第三方——劳资关系顾问——对协议的内容施加重大影响。这些模板在零售业和酒店业的集体协议中广泛复制,表明真正的讨价还价很少发生。对模板本身的研究揭示了雇主通过工作选择工作场所协议的强大机制减少和取消员工福利的可能性。这些模板提供了减少雇员对工作时间、名册、工作地点和工作职能的控制权的实例。这些规定的效果不仅是取代了裁决和国家立法中的条件,而且还危害了雇员根据其个人雇佣合同享有的权利。该报告还强调了由于在批准协议之前取消认证或审查程序而产生的一些问题。在工作选择协议下制定协议III协议中存在一些条款,这些条款低于“安全网”,或者误导员工关于他们的法律权利,这表明新的框架未能确保遵守基本的法律规则。法律框架似乎还使某些不公平的雇主谈判行为合法化,因为它取消了雇主向雇员解释工作场所协议的影响或对这些协议获得真正批准的任何积极要求,并且只提供了微弱的保护,防止虚假或误导行为和胁迫。这些不公平(但并非不合法)的做法包括:向新员工提供AWAs,要么接受,要么离开;在新项目上使用雇主绿地协议,设定较低的就业条件基础,并创造一个无工会的环境;在员工加入awas之前不给他们加薪,从而“饿死”员工。也许是受到“工作选择”创造的环境的鼓舞,一些雇主正在从事非法的讨价还价行为,例如通过减少轮班,或威胁取消其他员工福利,或终止他们的雇佣关系来对付拒绝签署AWAs的员工。需要进行根本性的改革,而不是采取权宜之计,以解决在工作选择框架下允许并在某种程度上鼓励的谈判做法和协议结果。如果不进行立法改革以确保真正的谈判和遵守协议制定规则,弱势雇员的工作条件将不可避免地进一步减少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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