Philosophical disagreement versus philosophical knowledge

Octavio Andrés García Aguilar, Luís Filipe Estevinha Rodrigues
{"title":"Philosophical disagreement versus philosophical knowledge","authors":"Octavio Andrés García Aguilar, Luís Filipe Estevinha Rodrigues","doi":"10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions to clarify why PHILOSOPHERS yields a skeptical verdict. Both conditions make philosophical disagreement an undefeated defeater for our philosophical beliefs. Second, we will discuss the Equal Weight (EW) as the view that requires parties to a disagreement to suspend judgment if parties comply with the symmetry and centrality conditions. Finally, we will discuss Kelly’s (2016) arguments against the skeptical outcomes of EW when applied to philosophical disagreement. We conclude that Kelly’s defense fails to defuse the skeptical outcomes of EW applied to philosophical disagreement.","PeriodicalId":191253,"journal":{"name":"Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions to clarify why PHILOSOPHERS yields a skeptical verdict. Both conditions make philosophical disagreement an undefeated defeater for our philosophical beliefs. Second, we will discuss the Equal Weight (EW) as the view that requires parties to a disagreement to suspend judgment if parties comply with the symmetry and centrality conditions. Finally, we will discuss Kelly’s (2016) arguments against the skeptical outcomes of EW when applied to philosophical disagreement. We conclude that Kelly’s defense fails to defuse the skeptical outcomes of EW applied to philosophical disagreement.
哲学分歧vs哲学知识
我们会说,哲学上的分歧给了我们怀疑哲学知识的充分理由。首先,我们将提出哲学家的案例,当涉及到哲学分歧时,产生一个怀疑的判决。然后,我们将讨论对称性和中心性条件,以澄清为什么哲学家会产生怀疑的结论。这两种情况都使哲学上的分歧成为我们哲学信仰的不败的敌人。其次,我们将讨论相等权重(EW)作为一种观点,如果各方符合对称性和中心性条件,则要求有分歧的各方暂停判断。最后,我们将讨论凯利(2016)在应用于哲学分歧时反对EW的怀疑结果的论点。我们得出的结论是,凯利的辩护未能化解应用于哲学分歧的EW的怀疑结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信