Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the FAS of the Russian Federation Based on the Indicator of Consumer Surplus

Abstract

The article distinguishes between the immediate and final results of the competition policy. The importance of taking into account the final results for the state and society is justified. It is argued that they can be quantified by calculating consumer benefits from eliminating and preventing violations of antitrust laws. The calculation method used in The Competition and Market Authority (CMA, UK) is given. In addition to calculating direct gains (losses), it also calculates indirect ones arising from the reaction of firms-outsiders to the investigation. The criteria for the effectiveness of competition policy in the UK and in Russia are described, and their comparison is carried out. The article reproduces the foreign experience of calculating consumer surplus on the example of the FAS’ investigation of the cartel. The resulting surplus is compared with the average consumer surplus calculated based on the amount of fines collected and the number of cases initiated. The structure of the FAS law enforcement in the context of saved surpluses is recognized as suboptimal. Next, a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of competition policy measures is carried out using the “difference-in-differences” method: the contribution of the FAS to the change in the prices of firms-violators is investigated. Based on the obtained estimates and data on the volume of sales of goods, consumer surpluses are calculated from the investigation of two types of violations – the conclusion of anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position, as well as from the prevention of violations by issuing warnings. Extrapolation of the surpluses to the entire set of cases for the year, and comparison of the total surpluses for the year with the FAS budget showed that the level of effectiveness of the competition policy in Russia is not inferior to the one in the UK.