An Ontological Analysis of Safety-Critical Software and Its Anomalies

Abstract

The progressively dominant role of software in safety-critical systems raise concerns about the software dependability. There are limited mature practices and guides for assessing software dependability and analyzing system-level hazards triggered by software anomalies. A problem is that faults, errors, and failures that represent software anomalies, albeit with different natures, are usually used indistinctly to predict software dependability, leading to unsolid results. The lack of such consensual conceptualization also leads to poor interoperability between supporting tools, and, consequently, difficulties in anomaly management and software maintenance. Anomaly analysis and management is more tough for safety-critical software due to its higher complexity and the safety-critical nature. The complex context of safety-critical software causes difficulties in determining the evolution/propagation path of software anomalies and the impact on system safety. To capture the nature of safety-critical software and support an understanding of mechanisms of software anomalies and associated hazards, we propose three reference ontologies: Safety-critical Software Ontology, Software Fault Ontology and Software-failure-induced Hazard Ontology, which are built based on international standards, guides, and relevant conceptual models. We also discuss the relationships among them. That will facilitate a better understanding of the software anomaly mechanisms and the design of intervening/mitigation solutions. We demonstrate how these ontologies can help analyze software problems of real-world safety-critical systems.