FirmwareDroid: Towards Automated Static Analysis of Pre-Installed Android Apps

Thomas Sutter, B. Tellenbach
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Supply chain attacks are an evolving threat to the IoT and mobile landscape. Recent malware findings have shown that even sizeable mobile phone vendors cannot defend their operating systems fully against pre-installed malware. Detecting and mitigating malware and software vulnerabilities on Android firmware is a challenging task requiring expertise in Android internals, such as customised firmware formats. Moreover, as users cannot choose what software is pre-installed on their devices, there is a fundamental lack of transparency and control. To make Android firmware analysis more accessible and regain some transparency, we present FirmwareDroid, a novel open-source security framework for Android firmware analysis that automates the extraction and analysis of pre-installed software.FirmwareDroid streamlines the process of software extraction from Android firmware for static security and privacy assessments. With FirmwareDroid, we lay the groundwork for researchers to automate the security assessment of Android firmware at scale, and we demonstrated the capabilities of FirmwareDroid by analysing 5,728 Android firmware samples from various vendors. We analysed 75,141 unique pre-installed Android applications to study how common advertising tracker libraries (a piece of software that collects user usage data) are used and which permissions pre-installed Android apps inherit. We conclude that 20.53% of all apps in our dataset include advertising trackers and that 88.14% of all used permissions are signature-based.
FirmwareDroid:迈向预安装Android应用程序的自动静态分析
供应链攻击是物联网和移动领域不断发展的威胁。最近的恶意软件调查结果表明,即使是相当大的手机供应商也无法完全保护他们的操作系统免受预安装的恶意软件的侵害。检测和减轻Android固件上的恶意软件和软件漏洞是一项具有挑战性的任务,需要Android内部的专业知识,例如定制固件格式。此外,由于用户无法选择在他们的设备上预装什么软件,因此从根本上缺乏透明度和控制。为了使Android固件分析更容易访问并重新获得一些透明度,我们提出了FirmwareDroid,这是一个用于Android固件分析的新型开源安全框架,可以自动提取和分析预装软件。FirmwareDroid简化了从Android固件中提取软件的过程,用于静态安全和隐私评估。通过FirmwareDroid,我们为研究人员大规模自动化Android固件安全评估奠定了基础,我们通过分析来自不同供应商的5728个Android固件样本来展示FirmwareDroid的功能。我们分析了75,141个独特的预装Android应用程序,以研究常见的广告跟踪库(一种收集用户使用数据的软件)的使用情况以及预装Android应用程序继承的权限。我们得出的结论是,在我们的数据集中,20.53%的应用程序包含广告跟踪器,88.14%的使用权限是基于签名的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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