{"title":"A bias for action? The military as an element of national power","authors":"J. Frewen","doi":"10.22459/ndst.07.2018.04","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Australia’s military instils in its members a ‘can-do’ culture with a bias for action, inculcated early in the careers of virtually all officers and enlisted personnel. This ethos seeks both to ensure that opportunities are seized and to avoid the more common historical peril of inaction. This instinct serves us well on the battlefield; it can be be of less benefit at the operational and strategic levels where consequences of decisions tend to be more farreaching. This bias is not merely a military concern. The public can also demonstrate a bias for action without due consideration of the broader political issues at stake. Depending on the circumstances, politicians can also demonstrate bias for either action or perceived action. Regardless, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is a relatively well-resourced and capable asset available to governments for a broad range of contingencies. From high-intensity warfighting to humanitarian operations, the ADF can be rapidly brought to bear to satisfy the ends of policy—uniquely in our government, through the employment of armed force. Yet, while the ADF can contribute to Australia’s national security, it cannot alone deliver national prosperity.","PeriodicalId":346795,"journal":{"name":"New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0: ANU Strategic & Defence Studies Centre's Golden Anniversary Conference Proceedings","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0: ANU Strategic & Defence Studies Centre's Golden Anniversary Conference Proceedings","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22459/ndst.07.2018.04","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Australia’s military instils in its members a ‘can-do’ culture with a bias for action, inculcated early in the careers of virtually all officers and enlisted personnel. This ethos seeks both to ensure that opportunities are seized and to avoid the more common historical peril of inaction. This instinct serves us well on the battlefield; it can be be of less benefit at the operational and strategic levels where consequences of decisions tend to be more farreaching. This bias is not merely a military concern. The public can also demonstrate a bias for action without due consideration of the broader political issues at stake. Depending on the circumstances, politicians can also demonstrate bias for either action or perceived action. Regardless, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is a relatively well-resourced and capable asset available to governments for a broad range of contingencies. From high-intensity warfighting to humanitarian operations, the ADF can be rapidly brought to bear to satisfy the ends of policy—uniquely in our government, through the employment of armed force. Yet, while the ADF can contribute to Australia’s national security, it cannot alone deliver national prosperity.