How Do Physicians Respond to Malpractice Allegations? Evidence from Florida Emergency Departments

C. Carroll, D. Cutler, A. Jena
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

A substantial literature has studied the influence of malpractice pressure on physician behavior. However, these studies generally focus on malpractice pressure stemming from state laws that govern liability exposure, which may be unknown or not salient to physicians. We test how physicians respond to malpractice allegations made directly against them. Our sample is Emergency Department physicians in Florida, where we have the universe of data on patients and how they are treated along with a census of malpractice complaints. We find that physicians oversee 9% fewer discharges after malpractice allegations and treat each discharge 4% more expensively after an allegation. These effects are true for both allegations that result in money paid and allegations which are dropped. Further, the increase in treatment is generalized, i.e., not limited to patients with conditions similar to what the physician is reported for. The results suggest significant, if modest, impacts of malpractice claims on medical practice.
医生如何应对医疗事故指控?佛罗里达急诊科的证据
大量文献研究了医疗事故压力对医生行为的影响。然而,这些研究通常侧重于医疗事故压力,这些压力来自于管理责任暴露的州法律,这可能是未知的或不突出的医生。我们测试医生如何应对直接针对他们的医疗事故指控。我们的样本是佛罗里达州急诊科的医生,在那里我们有大量关于病人的数据,以及他们是如何被治疗的,还有医疗事故投诉的普查。我们发现,在医疗事故指控后,医生监督的出院人数减少了9%,而在指控后,每次出院的治疗费用增加了4%。这些影响对导致支付款项的指控和放弃的指控都是真实的。此外,治疗的增加是普遍的,即不局限于与医生报告的情况相似的患者。结果表明,如果适度的话,医疗事故索赔对医疗实践的影响是显著的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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