UK Criminal Finances Act 2017: The Interplay between the New Corporate Offence for the Failure to Prevent the Criminal Facilitation of Tax Evasion and Legal Professional Privilege

Clement Migai
{"title":"UK Criminal Finances Act 2017: The Interplay between the New Corporate Offence for the Failure to Prevent the Criminal Facilitation of Tax Evasion and Legal Professional Privilege","authors":"Clement Migai","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3158742","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to the European Commission, Member States lose between 2% to 2.5% of their combined GDP annually to tax crimes. Tax avoidance and tax evasion have also dominated news recently especially following the Panama Papers/Mossack Fonseca Leak and the Paradise Papers. Whereas these leaks, particularly the Paradise Papers, encompassed arrangements that may have involved tax evasion, a lot of the arrangements involved legal tax avoidance, albeit highly aggressive. In response many governments are using the Automatic Exchange of Information and the Common Reporting Standard as a lever to encourage voluntary disclosure of non-reported offshore income among other tools to fight tax evasion. In the United Kingdom, the Criminal Finance Act 2017 received Royal Assent on 27 April 2017 and came into effect on 30 September 30, 2017. Among other objectives, it created a new corporate offence of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion by an associated person, whether in the United Kingdom or in a foreign jurisdiction. It paves way for holding corporate entities liable where those “associated” with it have engaged in the criminal facilitation of tax evasion. The new corporate offence of failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion was birthed out of the difficulties faced in the UK in holding corporate entities criminally responsible because of the “identification doctrine” that required prosecutors to prove that a “directing mind” within the organization. Therefore, this paper first explores the concept of the “identification doctrine”, criticisms levelled against it and why it was considered an impediment to making corporate entities liable for economic crimes that resulted the move towards a “strict liability” offence. It then focuses on the scope of the new corporate offence and examines the persons covered, the two elements i.e. the failure to prevent the facilitation of a United Kingdom tax evasion offence and the failure to prevent the facilitation of foreign tax evasion offences, the stages involved and the challenges posed by the requirement for dual criminality and the extra-territorial application of the later offence. Lawyers can and often play a role in the facilitation of tax evasion. In light of the findings of the European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry into Money Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion (PANA), the Bari Declaration of May 13, 2017 and work undertaken by the OECD (for example the Ten Global Principles launched at the OECD´s Fifth Forum on Tax and Crime, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) and the Mandatory Disclosure Rules for Addressing CRS Avoidance Agreements and Offshore Structures) this paper also looks at the spillover effects of the new UK corporate offence on tax advisers and lawyers in their capacity as “associated persons” vis-a-vis the defense of legal professional privilege. It concludes that the Criminal Finances Act 2017 is consistent with the doctrine of legal professional privilege. It is also consistent with the proposals from the OECD´s Fifth Forum on Tax and Crime that requires professional enablers to play their part in tackling tax crime by ensuring that they have taken reasonable steps to prevent their associated persons from criminally facilitating tax evasion, domestically and internationally. As recommended, it criminalizes the act of aiding, abetting, facilitating or enabling the commission of a tax offence by others and also makes legal persons and legal arrangements liable for prosecution for committing or facilitating the commission of a tax crime. The Criminal Finances Act 2017 may also cover professional enablers and service providers who are actively marketing schemes designed to circumvent the CRS reporting requirements if it leads to the failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion. It is therefore aligned with the OECD Mandatory Disclosure Rules for Addressing CRS Avoidance Agreements and Offshore Structures.","PeriodicalId":223837,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Criminal Law (Public Law - Crime) (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Criminal Law (Public Law - Crime) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3158742","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

According to the European Commission, Member States lose between 2% to 2.5% of their combined GDP annually to tax crimes. Tax avoidance and tax evasion have also dominated news recently especially following the Panama Papers/Mossack Fonseca Leak and the Paradise Papers. Whereas these leaks, particularly the Paradise Papers, encompassed arrangements that may have involved tax evasion, a lot of the arrangements involved legal tax avoidance, albeit highly aggressive. In response many governments are using the Automatic Exchange of Information and the Common Reporting Standard as a lever to encourage voluntary disclosure of non-reported offshore income among other tools to fight tax evasion. In the United Kingdom, the Criminal Finance Act 2017 received Royal Assent on 27 April 2017 and came into effect on 30 September 30, 2017. Among other objectives, it created a new corporate offence of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion by an associated person, whether in the United Kingdom or in a foreign jurisdiction. It paves way for holding corporate entities liable where those “associated” with it have engaged in the criminal facilitation of tax evasion. The new corporate offence of failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion was birthed out of the difficulties faced in the UK in holding corporate entities criminally responsible because of the “identification doctrine” that required prosecutors to prove that a “directing mind” within the organization. Therefore, this paper first explores the concept of the “identification doctrine”, criticisms levelled against it and why it was considered an impediment to making corporate entities liable for economic crimes that resulted the move towards a “strict liability” offence. It then focuses on the scope of the new corporate offence and examines the persons covered, the two elements i.e. the failure to prevent the facilitation of a United Kingdom tax evasion offence and the failure to prevent the facilitation of foreign tax evasion offences, the stages involved and the challenges posed by the requirement for dual criminality and the extra-territorial application of the later offence. Lawyers can and often play a role in the facilitation of tax evasion. In light of the findings of the European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry into Money Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion (PANA), the Bari Declaration of May 13, 2017 and work undertaken by the OECD (for example the Ten Global Principles launched at the OECD´s Fifth Forum on Tax and Crime, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) and the Mandatory Disclosure Rules for Addressing CRS Avoidance Agreements and Offshore Structures) this paper also looks at the spillover effects of the new UK corporate offence on tax advisers and lawyers in their capacity as “associated persons” vis-a-vis the defense of legal professional privilege. It concludes that the Criminal Finances Act 2017 is consistent with the doctrine of legal professional privilege. It is also consistent with the proposals from the OECD´s Fifth Forum on Tax and Crime that requires professional enablers to play their part in tackling tax crime by ensuring that they have taken reasonable steps to prevent their associated persons from criminally facilitating tax evasion, domestically and internationally. As recommended, it criminalizes the act of aiding, abetting, facilitating or enabling the commission of a tax offence by others and also makes legal persons and legal arrangements liable for prosecution for committing or facilitating the commission of a tax crime. The Criminal Finances Act 2017 may also cover professional enablers and service providers who are actively marketing schemes designed to circumvent the CRS reporting requirements if it leads to the failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion. It is therefore aligned with the OECD Mandatory Disclosure Rules for Addressing CRS Avoidance Agreements and Offshore Structures.
英国《2017年刑事金融法》:未能防止为逃税提供刑事便利的新公司罪行与法律专业特权之间的相互作用
根据欧盟委员会的数据,成员国每年因税收犯罪而损失的GDP总额约为2%至2.5%。虽然这些泄密,尤其是“天堂文件”,包含了可能涉及逃税的安排,但许多安排涉及合法避税,尽管非常激进。作为回应,许多政府正在利用《信息自动交换》和《共同报告标准》作为杠杆,鼓励自愿披露未报告的离岸收入,以及其他打击逃税的工具。在英国,《2017年犯罪金融法》于2017年4月27日获得御准,并于2017年9月30日生效。除其他目标外,它还设立了一项新的公司罪行,即未能防止为关联人逃税提供便利,无论是在联合王国还是在外国司法管辖区。它为让那些与它“有关联”的公司实体承担责任铺平了道路,这些公司实体为逃税提供了刑事便利。未能防止为逃税提供刑事便利这一新的公司罪行,产生于英国在追究公司实体刑事责任方面面临的困难,因为“身份认定原则”要求检察官证明组织内存在“指导思想”。因此,本文首先探讨了“认定原则”的概念,对它的批评,以及为什么它被认为是使公司实体对经济犯罪承担责任的障碍,从而导致了向“严格责任”犯罪的转变。然后,它侧重于新的公司犯罪的范围,并审查所涵盖的人员,两个要素,即未能防止为联合王国逃税犯罪提供便利和未能防止为外国逃税犯罪提供便利,涉及的阶段和双重犯罪要求所带来的挑战以及后一种犯罪的域外适用。律师可以而且经常在帮助逃税方面发挥作用。鉴于欧洲议会洗钱、避税和逃税调查委员会(PANA)的调查结果、2017年5月13日的《巴里宣言》以及经合组织开展的工作(例如经合组织第五届税收与犯罪论坛上发布的十项全球原则),共同报告标准(CRS)和解决CRS避免协议和离岸结构的强制性披露规则),本文还研究了英国新公司犯罪对税务顾问和律师的溢出效应,他们的身份是“关联人”,相对于法律专业特权的辩护。它的结论是,《2017年刑事金融法》与法律职业特权原则是一致的。这也与经合组织第五届税收与犯罪论坛的建议相一致,该论坛要求专业推动者在打击税收犯罪方面发挥作用,确保他们采取合理措施,防止其关联人员在国内和国际上为逃税提供犯罪便利。按照建议,它将协助、教唆、便利或使他人犯下税务罪行的行为定为刑事犯罪,并使法人和法律安排因犯下或便利犯下税务罪行而受到起诉。《2017年刑事金融法》也可能涵盖积极营销旨在规避CRS报告要求的计划的专业推动者和服务提供商,如果这导致未能防止为逃税提供刑事便利。因此,它符合经合组织关于解决CRS避免协议和离岸结构的强制性披露规则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信