{"title":"Ora et Guberna. The Economic Impact of the Rule of St Benedict in Medieval England","authors":"D. Rossignoli, Federico Trombetta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3457764","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Does it matter, in terms of economic performance, whether it is a secular or a religious ruler who exercises political power? To answer this question, we have used data on land ownership and economic productivity in Medieval England, characterised by institutional variation at local level. Exploiting the Norman conquest of England as a historical experiment, we compare a measure of the economic performance of estates controlled by secular feudal landlords, Benedictine monasteries or bishops and other ecclesiastical landlords. We show that holdings governed by Benedictine monasteries experienced a significantly higher growth rate in productive capacity, when compared with those controlled by secular landlords. Collecting new data about abbots’ biographical information, we provide evidence suggesting that part of the effect is due to the selection of the monastic leadership through elections. Finally, we rule out alternative potential channels.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic History eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3457764","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Does it matter, in terms of economic performance, whether it is a secular or a religious ruler who exercises political power? To answer this question, we have used data on land ownership and economic productivity in Medieval England, characterised by institutional variation at local level. Exploiting the Norman conquest of England as a historical experiment, we compare a measure of the economic performance of estates controlled by secular feudal landlords, Benedictine monasteries or bishops and other ecclesiastical landlords. We show that holdings governed by Benedictine monasteries experienced a significantly higher growth rate in productive capacity, when compared with those controlled by secular landlords. Collecting new data about abbots’ biographical information, we provide evidence suggesting that part of the effect is due to the selection of the monastic leadership through elections. Finally, we rule out alternative potential channels.