Human Rights Investment Filters: A Defense

Abstract

Do investors have an obligation to not invest in corporations that contribute to human rights violations? – Even when such divestment neither causes changes in the corporations, nor prevents the violations? Is there a justification of divestment that holds up even in the face of general breaches of the norms? Can such a justification avoid reliance on controversial religious views? And are there any grounds to believe that such divestment may be effective against human rights violations, even in the absence of a powerful hegemon that sanctions violations of the norms? The affirmative answers below draw on theories of legitimacy and distributive justice that regard SRI as part of a response to the challenges of globalization. Section 1 frames the issues, drawing on the discussions among Quakers on divesting from the slave trade in the 18th century. Sections 2 and 3 provide a normative defense for some minimal human rights filters on investments under economic globalization. Section 4 addresses several objections.