{"title":"Why the European Commission's Enforcement Priorities on Article 82 EC Should Be Withdrawn","authors":"Liza Lovdahl Gormsen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2400402","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"On December 3, 2008, the Commission issued its Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (the “Guidance Paper”). This marks the end of the Commission's review on art. 82, which the Commission initiated in the summer of 2003. Prior to the Guidance Paper, DG Competition (“DG Comp”) released its Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses in December 2005 (the “Discussion Paper”). This was an unusual step compared to the Commission's normal practice of producing a Green Paper, and may hint at a disagreement within the Commission as to publishing guidelines at all. The Discussion Paper was a staff paper, which was meant only for consultation to allow interested parties to express their view on a text that might become substantive guidelines later. It was not an authoritative source or even published in the Official Journal. Despite being no more than a staff discussion paper, it was drafted as substantive guidelines, which raised expectations of the Commission issuing substantive guidance at a later stage. Against these expectations, the Commission issued enforcement priorities on art. 82. This naturally raises two questions: (i) why did the Commission decide to issue enforcement priorities instead of substantive guidelines; and (ii) is the Guidance Paper in its current form a good solution? This paper explains the Commission's uneasy relationship with case law in this area of law, its desire to develop its policy beyond the framework of the Community Courts -- the Court of First Instance (CFI) and European Court of Justice (ECJ) -- and why “enforcement priorities” is not an ideal solution.","PeriodicalId":410225,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"12","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Competition Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2400402","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Abstract
On December 3, 2008, the Commission issued its Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (the “Guidance Paper”). This marks the end of the Commission's review on art. 82, which the Commission initiated in the summer of 2003. Prior to the Guidance Paper, DG Competition (“DG Comp”) released its Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses in December 2005 (the “Discussion Paper”). This was an unusual step compared to the Commission's normal practice of producing a Green Paper, and may hint at a disagreement within the Commission as to publishing guidelines at all. The Discussion Paper was a staff paper, which was meant only for consultation to allow interested parties to express their view on a text that might become substantive guidelines later. It was not an authoritative source or even published in the Official Journal. Despite being no more than a staff discussion paper, it was drafted as substantive guidelines, which raised expectations of the Commission issuing substantive guidance at a later stage. Against these expectations, the Commission issued enforcement priorities on art. 82. This naturally raises two questions: (i) why did the Commission decide to issue enforcement priorities instead of substantive guidelines; and (ii) is the Guidance Paper in its current form a good solution? This paper explains the Commission's uneasy relationship with case law in this area of law, its desire to develop its policy beyond the framework of the Community Courts -- the Court of First Instance (CFI) and European Court of Justice (ECJ) -- and why “enforcement priorities” is not an ideal solution.
2008年12月3日,欧盟委员会发布了《关于欧盟条约第82条适用于主导企业滥用排他性行为的优先执行指南》(“指南文件”)。这标志着委员会对艺术的审查已经结束。82,委员会于2003年夏天启动。在发表指引文件前,竞争总局("竞争总局")已于2005年12月发表了《公约第82条适用于排他性滥用的讨论文件》("讨论文件")。与委员会编制绿皮书的正常做法相比,这是一个不同寻常的步骤,可能暗示委员会内部对出版准则存在分歧。讨论文件是一份工作人员文件,其目的仅是供协商,以便有关各方就日后可能成为实质性准则的案文发表意见。它不是一个权威的来源,甚至没有发表在官方杂志上。尽管它只是一份工作人员讨论文件,但它是作为实质性准则起草的,这提高了委员会在稍后阶段发布实质性准则的期望。与这些期望相反,委员会发布了艺术方面的执法优先事项。82. 这自然提出了两个问题:(i)委员会为什么决定发布执法优先次序,而不是实质性指导方针;及(ii)目前形式的指引文件是否一个良好的解决方案?本文解释了欧盟委员会在这一法律领域与判例法之间的不安关系,它希望在共同体法院(一审法院(Court of First Instance, CFI)和欧洲法院(European Court, ECJ)的框架之外发展其政策,以及为什么“执法优先”不是一个理想的解决方案。