Intelligibility, practical reason and the common good

Abstract

The new natural law theorists, such as Germain Grisez, John Finnis and Joseph M Boyle, argue that intentional human action is oriented towards a plurality of basic goods.1 This focus on the role of the good in orienting action—and its subsequent implications for practical reason, politics and law—is a recurring and central theme of the natural law tradition. The basic goods, according to the new natural law theorists, render human action intelligible. The intelligibility of an action does not guarantee its reasonableness: that depends on whether the action is oriented towards the basic goods in a way that meets the requirements of practical rationality. However, an action that fails to be intelligible will fail to be reasonable, because it is not directed at any underlying good. The intelligibility of an action, on this view, is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for its reasonableness.