The Presumption and Quantification of Harm in the Damages Directive and the Practical Guide

Marios Iacovides
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Abstract

One of the beneficial innovations for claimants introduced by the EU Competition Damages Directive is the rebuttable presumption of harm in cartel cases enshrined in Article 17(2). Especially for follow-on claimants, i.e. claimants who base their case on a cartel case that has already been brought successfully by the European Commission or by a national competition authority, the presumption of harm will be of the greatest utility. Not having to prove the infringement, nor that the cartel has resulted in some harm, will leave them with the need to only show loss, causation and quantum. Stand-alone claimants will need to prove the infringement of EU (or national) competition law in addition to that.

The estimation of the quantum of damages in competition law cases can be costly in terms of time, effort and resources, due to the complexity of the economic data and the methods of transforming it into legally meaningful indicators of damage. The estimation is also inherently speculative, since it involves a counterfactual. Although the existence of harm and its quantification are two distinct elements of a successful claim for damages, the benefits from the former depend to a great extent on the latter. This was realised by the drafters of the Directive, who included in Article 17 an obligation on national courts to estimate the harm and an option for national competition authorities to assist in its calculation.

In this paper, I discuss the relationship between the presumption of harm and its quantification, and by extension also the relationship between the Damages Directive and the Practical Guide on Quantifying the harm.

As shown in the paper, it is doubtful that the presumption of harm in cartels will make much practical difference in the case law. The positive impact will instead come from the national courts’ power to estimate the harm, and the national competition authorities’ possibility to assist therewith.

损害赔偿指令与实务指南中损害的推定与量化
欧盟《竞争损害赔偿指令》对索赔人提出的有益创新之一是第17(2)条规定的卡特尔案件中可反驳的损害推定。特别是对于后续索赔人,即基于欧盟委员会或国家竞争管理机构已经成功提起的卡特尔案件提起诉讼的索赔人,损害推定将具有最大的效用。不需要证明侵权行为,也不需要证明卡特尔造成了一些损害,这将使他们只需要证明损失、因果关系和数量。除此之外,独立的索赔人还需要证明违反了欧盟(或国家)竞争法。由于经济数据的复杂性以及将其转化为具有法律意义的损害指标的方法,竞争法案件中损害金额的估计在时间、精力和资源方面可能是昂贵的。这种估计本身也是推测性的,因为它涉及到一个反事实。虽然损害的存在和损害的量化是成功的损害索赔的两个不同因素,但前者的利益在很大程度上取决于后者。该指令的起草者意识到了这一点,他们在第17条中规定了国家法院评估损害的义务,并为国家竞争管理机构提供了协助其计算的选项。本文讨论了损害推定与损害量化之间的关系,进而探讨了损害赔偿指令与损害量化实用指南之间的关系。本文认为,卡特尔损害推定是否会在判例法中产生实际影响值得怀疑。相反,积极的影响将来自于国家法院评估损害的权力,以及国家竞争管理机构在这方面提供协助的可能性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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