Who Is Targeted by the Council’s Sanctions? The UN Security Council and the Principle of Proportionality

Abstract

The current article aims to assess proportionality within the context of the Security Council’s practice, focusing specifically on how the Council balances various interests in the design of sanctions regimes adopted pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter. It argues that proportionality in this context plays a role in the Security Council’s targeting decisions on the one hand and in the determination of whose interests are affected by the sanctions on the other. This implies that the Security Council should distinguish, first, between those who should be subjected to sanctions (the targets) and those would should be shielded (third parties) and, second, that it carefully delineates the targets of the sanctions. This article assesses this balancing exercise within the context of the Council’s measures to curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources financing armed conflict on the one hand and with respect to countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the other.