Basel IV Postponed: A Chance to Regulate Shadow Banking?

Katarzyna Parchimowicz, R. Spence
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Abstract

In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, regulators have agreed a substantial tightening of prudential regulation for banks operating in the traditional banking sector (TBS). The TBS is stringently regulated under the Basel Accords to moderate financial stability and to minimise risk to government and taxpayers. While prudential regulation is important from a financial stability perspective, the flipside is that the Basel Accords only apply to the TBS, they do not regulate the shadow banking sector (SBS). While it is not disputed that the SBS provides numerous benefits given the net credit growth of the economy since the global financial crisis has come from the SBS rather than traditional banking channels, the SBS also poses many risks. Therefore, the fact that the SBS is not subject to prudential regulation is a cause of serious systemic concern. The introduction of Basel IV, which compliments Basel III, seeks to complete the Basel framework on prudential banking regulation. On the example of this set of standards and its potential negative consequences for the TBS, this paper aims to visualise the incentives for TBS institutions to move some of their activities into the SBS, and thus stress the need for more comprehensive regulation of the SBS. Current coronavirus crisis forced Basel Committee to postpone implementation of the Basel IV rules – this could be perceived as a chance to complete the financial regulatory framework and address the SBS as well.
巴塞尔协议IV延期:监管影子银行的机会?
在2007年全球金融危机之后,监管机构同意大幅收紧对在传统银行业(TBS)经营的银行的审慎监管。TBS受到《巴塞尔协议》(Basel Accords)的严格监管,以保持金融稳定,并将政府和纳税人面临的风险降至最低。虽然从金融稳定的角度来看,审慎监管很重要,但不利的一面是,巴塞尔协议仅适用于TBS,而不监管影子银行部门(SBS)。由于全球金融危机是由SBS而不是传统的银行渠道引起的,因此SBS提供了许多好处,这是无可争议的,但SBS也带来了许多风险。因此,SBS不受审慎监管的事实是一个严重的系统性问题。《巴塞尔协议IV》是对《巴塞尔协议III》的补充,旨在完善审慎银行监管的巴塞尔框架。以这一套标准及其对TBS的潜在负面影响为例,本文旨在可视化TBS机构将其部分活动转移到SBS的动机,从而强调对SBS进行更全面监管的必要性。当前的冠状病毒危机迫使巴塞尔委员会推迟实施巴塞尔协议IV规则——这可以被视为一个完成金融监管框架并解决SBS问题的机会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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