{"title":"Typology of Guilt and Shame","authors":"S. Fredericks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842699.003.0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Because primary sources about environmental guilt and shame discussed in Chapter 2 do not define or differentiate guilt or shame consistently, systematically explore their implications, or explain the notions of collective agency that they presume, Chapter 3 constructs a typology of guilt and shame to stabilize the subsequent analysis. It uses material from moral and social psychology, especially work by June Price Tangney and her colleagues, as well as social, historical, and philosophical studies of collective experiences of guilt and shame after the Holocaust and other atrocities. The state of being guilty or shameful occurs when an agent breaks or fails to live up to their ideals. “Guilt” here refers to the actions and shame to the conditions of the agent’s identity under these circumstances. Guilt and shame feelings are negative emotions about such actions (guilt) or assessments of identity (shame). Guilt and shame states and feelings can refer to individuals, membership groups, or collectives. Memberships are groups in which the individuals are the agents, whereas collectives have agency, identity, and responsibility more than the sum of the individuals in them. Agents can also judge another as guilty or shameful and/or attempt to instill guilt or shame feelings in them; such judgments depend in part on the cultural views of guilt and/or shame. The distinctions articulated in this typology are analytically and practically useful but are not absolute, as different types of guilt and shame may co-occur or catalyze each other.","PeriodicalId":267378,"journal":{"name":"Environmental Guilt and Shame","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Environmental Guilt and Shame","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842699.003.0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Because primary sources about environmental guilt and shame discussed in Chapter 2 do not define or differentiate guilt or shame consistently, systematically explore their implications, or explain the notions of collective agency that they presume, Chapter 3 constructs a typology of guilt and shame to stabilize the subsequent analysis. It uses material from moral and social psychology, especially work by June Price Tangney and her colleagues, as well as social, historical, and philosophical studies of collective experiences of guilt and shame after the Holocaust and other atrocities. The state of being guilty or shameful occurs when an agent breaks or fails to live up to their ideals. “Guilt” here refers to the actions and shame to the conditions of the agent’s identity under these circumstances. Guilt and shame feelings are negative emotions about such actions (guilt) or assessments of identity (shame). Guilt and shame states and feelings can refer to individuals, membership groups, or collectives. Memberships are groups in which the individuals are the agents, whereas collectives have agency, identity, and responsibility more than the sum of the individuals in them. Agents can also judge another as guilty or shameful and/or attempt to instill guilt or shame feelings in them; such judgments depend in part on the cultural views of guilt and/or shame. The distinctions articulated in this typology are analytically and practically useful but are not absolute, as different types of guilt and shame may co-occur or catalyze each other.