{"title":"Judicial Decision-Making","authors":"D. Teichman, E. Zamir","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199945474.013.0026","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the rich behavioral research on judicial decision-making. It opens with general theories of the cognitive process of judicial decision-making, focusing on the story model and coherence-based reasoning. It examines how various heuristics and biases—such as the compromise and contrast effects, hindsight bias, omission bias, and anchoring—are reflected in judicial decision-making. Special attention is given to the limited ability of fact-finders to disregard inadmissible evidence, the interactions between race and judicial decision-making, the role of non-consequentialist moral judgments in judicial decision-making, and the impact of the choice between rules and standards on the predictability of judgments. Finally, the chapter discusses two fundamental questions in the behavioral analysis of judicial decision-making: group decision-making, and decision-making by judges (as opposed to laypersons).","PeriodicalId":447034,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Law and Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Behavioral Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199945474.013.0026","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Abstract
This chapter discusses the rich behavioral research on judicial decision-making. It opens with general theories of the cognitive process of judicial decision-making, focusing on the story model and coherence-based reasoning. It examines how various heuristics and biases—such as the compromise and contrast effects, hindsight bias, omission bias, and anchoring—are reflected in judicial decision-making. Special attention is given to the limited ability of fact-finders to disregard inadmissible evidence, the interactions between race and judicial decision-making, the role of non-consequentialist moral judgments in judicial decision-making, and the impact of the choice between rules and standards on the predictability of judgments. Finally, the chapter discusses two fundamental questions in the behavioral analysis of judicial decision-making: group decision-making, and decision-making by judges (as opposed to laypersons).