Snobs and Quality Gaps

S. Basov
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Abstract

The paper characterizes the optimal provision of quality by a monopolist facing a population of consumers with private valuation for quality. Unlike previous models by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and others, this paper assumes there is a mass of consumers who prefer the highest quality goods. I liken these consumers to snobs who demand the highest valued goods. I show that the quality supplied jumps discontinuously as the highest valued consumers are encountered and the variety of products is reduced as the population of snobs increases. I also show that only snobs may be supplied once their population grows to a critical size.
势利和质量差距
本文描述了垄断者面对一群对质量有私人估价的消费者时所提供的最优质量。与Mussa和Rosen(1978)等人之前的模型不同,本文假设存在大量偏好最高质量商品的消费者。我把这些消费者比作势利者,他们要求最高价值的商品。我表明,当遇到最有价值的消费者时,供应的质量会不连续地跳跃,而随着势利者数量的增加,产品的种类会减少。我还表明,当人口增长到临界规模时,只会供应势利者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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