Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

E. Elton, M. Gruber, Christopher R. Blake
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引用次数: 469

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.
奖励费和共同基金
本文考察了激励费用对共同基金经理行为的影响。有奖励费的基金表现出积极的选股能力,但贝塔系数小于1导致基金无法获得积极的奖励费。从投资者的角度来看,正阿尔法加上较低的费用比率使激励费用基金具有吸引力。然而,奖励费基金比非奖励费基金承担更多的风险,并且在一段时间的业绩不佳后,它们会增加风险。奖励费是有用的营销工具,因为更多的新现金流流入奖励费基金,而不是非奖励费基金。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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