Quality Disclosure Under Consumer Loss Aversion

Jianqiang Zhang, Krista J. Li
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引用次数: 29

Abstract

Consumers experience a sense of loss when a product’s quality does not match their expectations. To alleviate consumer loss aversion (CLA), firms can disclose information to reduce consumers’ uncertainty about product quality and the resulting psychological loss. In this paper, we investigate the implications of CLA on firm profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare when firms endogenously make quality disclosure decisions. We find that CLA leads symmetric firms to disclose quality more often. Given that CLA weakly reduces consumers’ utility from buying a product and quality disclosure is costly, intuition suggests that CLA is detrimental to firms. We find that this intuition is true only in a monopoly. Surprisingly, CLA makes both firms in a competition better off. Moreover, CLA increases firms’ profit when they invest in quality disclosure instead of money-back guarantees to respond to CLA. We also find that CLA decreases consumer surplus and social welfare. Therefore, educating consumers to improve decision-making skills by deliberating on future outcomes and emotions can benefit firms at the cost of consumers and society. When firms disclose quality sequentially, CLA can discourage the follower from disclosing quality. A strong level of CLA increases the leader’s profit over the follower’s, thereby encouraging firms to be the first mover in quality disclosure. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.
消费者损失规避下的质量信息披露
当产品的质量不符合他们的期望时,消费者会有一种失落感。为了缓解消费者损失厌恶,企业可以通过信息披露来降低消费者对产品质量的不确定性和由此产生的心理损失。本文研究了当企业内部做出质量披露决策时,CLA对企业利润、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。我们发现CLA导致对称公司更频繁地披露质量。鉴于CLA微弱地降低了消费者购买产品的效用,而且质量披露代价高昂,直觉表明CLA对企业是有害的。我们发现,这种直觉只有在垄断企业中才成立。令人惊讶的是,CLA使竞争中的两家公司都受益。此外,当企业投资于质量披露而不是退款保证来应对CLA时,CLA增加了企业的利润。我们还发现,CLA降低了消费者剩余和社会福利。因此,教育消费者通过考虑未来的结果和情绪来提高决策技能,可以以消费者和社会为代价使企业受益。当企业按顺序披露质量信息时,CLA可以阻止跟随者披露质量信息。高水平的CLA会增加领导者相对于追随者的利润,从而鼓励企业成为质量披露的先行者。本文被市场部的张娟娟接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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