A Modular Testing Environment for Implementation Attacks

L. Judge, M. Cantrell, C. Kendir, P. Schaumont
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Implementation attacks, including side-channel, fault, and probing attacks, have received significant attention in both research and commercial communities. Successful attacks have been demonstrated against standard cryptographic algorithms implemented on a wide variety of common platforms. In order to protect against these attacks, designers must incorporate complex countermeasures into the implementation of sensitive operations. Validating the effectiveness of implementation attack countermeasures requires specialized expertise and techniques not commonly used in other types of security and functional testing. We propose a modular testing environment for use in verifying the implementation attack resistance of secure systems. The proposed environment is an open-source solution that allows implementation attack testing to be independent of the system platform, implementation details, and type of attack under evaluation. These key features make the environment suitable for use with an implementation attack security standard in which standard test procedures are published openly and used to evaluate cryptographic systems. We use the proposed test environment to demonstrate a successful side-channel attack on AES, which illustrates the practical usefulness of our design for analyzing implementation attack security. Our open-source design is available at \url{http://rijndael.ece.vt.edu/iameter}.
实现攻击的模块化测试环境
实现攻击,包括侧信道攻击、故障攻击和探测攻击,在研究和商业社区中都受到了极大的关注。针对各种通用平台上实现的标准加密算法的成功攻击已经被证明。为了防止这些攻击,设计人员必须将复杂的对策纳入敏感操作的实现中。验证实现攻击对策的有效性需要在其他类型的安全性和功能测试中不常用的专门知识和技术。我们提出了一个模块化的测试环境,用于验证安全系统的实现抗攻击能力。所建议的环境是一个开源解决方案,它允许实现攻击测试独立于系统平台、实现细节和评估中的攻击类型。这些关键特性使该环境适合与实现攻击安全标准一起使用,其中公开发布标准测试过程并用于评估加密系统。我们使用提议的测试环境来演示对AES的成功的侧信道攻击,这说明了我们的设计在分析实现攻击安全性方面的实际用途。我们的开源设计可以在\url{http://rijndael.ece.vt.edu/iameter}上找到。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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