{"title":"A model of long-term contracts","authors":"John B. Bryant","doi":"10.21034/sr.47","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Long-term contracts are explained as equilibrium strategies of supergames. In the specific coherent general equilibrium model provided, limited mobility of labor, in the form of a fixed cost of moving, generates long-term contracts.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Staff Report","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.47","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Long-term contracts are explained as equilibrium strategies of supergames. In the specific coherent general equilibrium model provided, limited mobility of labor, in the form of a fixed cost of moving, generates long-term contracts.