12.3 Exploring PUF-Controlled PA Spectral Regrowth for Physical-Layer Identification of IoT Nodes

Qiang Zhou, Yan He, Kaiyuan Yang, T. Chi
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

It is projected that 75 billion Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices will be deployed for applications such as wearable electronics and smart home by 2025. Securing IoT devices is one of the most significant barriers we need to overcome for large-scale IoT adoption. Conventional wireless security has been implemented solely using upper-layer cryptography [1]. Unfortunately, IoT nodes are often energy-constrained and may not have enough computational resources to implement advanced asymmetric cryptographic algorithms and public-key-infrastructures (PKI) [2]–[3]. To overcome this challenge, there has been growing interest in leveraging the physical impairments of the radios that are bonded to specific TX for secure identification [4] –[6], a.k.a. RF fingerprinting. If Bob (the RX) has sufficient sensitivity, it can identify Alice (the legitimate TX) and the malicious impersonator during demodulation based on their inherent radio signatures, similar to how we distinguish different people based on their unique voice signatures (Fig. 12.3.1). As the device-dependent radio impairments come from process variation, it is challenging for impersonators to forge in practice. In addition, unlike conventional identification approach that device IDs are inserted in preambles and checked only once a while, RF fingerprinting enables continuous identification at any moment during communication, leading to a tighter bond between the data packet and device.
12.3探索puf控制的PA谱再生用于物联网节点的物理层识别
据预测,到2025年,可穿戴电子产品和智能家居等应用领域将部署750亿台物联网(IoT)设备。确保物联网设备的安全是大规模采用物联网需要克服的最重要障碍之一。传统的无线安全仅使用上层加密技术实现[1]。不幸的是,物联网节点通常受到能量限制,可能没有足够的计算资源来实现高级非对称加密算法和公钥基础设施(PKI)[2] -[3]。为了克服这一挑战,人们对利用绑定到特定TX的无线电的物理损伤进行安全识别[4]-[6](即射频指纹识别)越来越感兴趣。如果Bob (RX)具有足够的灵敏度,它可以根据其固有的无线电签名在解调期间识别Alice(合法TX)和恶意模仿者,类似于我们如何根据其独特的语音签名区分不同的人(图12.3.1)。由于设备相关的无线电损伤来自于工艺变化,因此仿冒者在实践中很难伪造。此外,与传统的识别方法不同,设备id插入序言中,只检查一次,射频指纹识别可以在通信过程中的任何时刻进行连续识别,从而使数据包和设备之间的联系更加紧密。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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