Optimal Queue Design

Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

We study the optimal design of a queueing system when agents' arrival and servicing are governed by a general Markov process. The designer of the system chooses entry and exit rules for agents, their service priority---or queueing discipline---as well as their information, while ensuring that agents have incentives to follow the designer's recommendations not only to join the queue but more importantly to stay in the queue. Under a mild condition, the optimal mechanism has a cutoff structure---agents are induced to enter up to a certain queue length and no agents are to exit the queue once they enter the queue; the agents on the queue are served according to a first-come-first-served (FCFS) rule; and they are given no information throughout the process beyond the recommendations they receive from the designer. FCFS is also necessary for optimality in a rich domain. We identify a novel role for queueing disciplines in regulating agents' beliefs, and their dynamic incentives, thus uncovering a hitherto unrecognized virtue of FCFS in this regard.
最优队列设计
研究了agent到达和服务受一般马尔可夫过程约束时排队系统的最优设计问题。系统的设计者为代理选择进入和退出规则,他们的服务优先级(或排队纪律)以及他们的信息,同时确保代理有动机遵循设计者的建议,不仅加入队列,更重要的是留在队列中。在温和条件下,最优机制具有截止结构——诱导agent进入一定长度的队列,并且一旦进入队列,不允许任何agent退出;队列上的agent按照先到先得(FCFS)规则进行服务;在整个过程中,除了设计师的推荐之外,他们不会获得任何信息。FCFS对于富域的最优性也是必要的。我们确定了排队规则在调节代理信念及其动态激励方面的新作用,从而揭示了迄今为止尚未认识到的FCFS在这方面的优点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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