Attacking a packet Analyzer: Caronte case study

D. Granata, M. Rak, Francesco Grimaldi
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Abstract

Nowadays it is common the adoption of network traffic analysis tools as a protection against possible cyberattacks, but Attackers have become increasingly skilled at building more and more complex attacks in order to avoid IDS/IPS action, typically through the adoption of evasion that hides attacks to the monitoring system. In this paper, we test an innovative idea to build attacks, that relies on the idea of carrying out attacks against a specific component of IDS/IPS, the packet analyzers, in order to make it (at least temporarily) unavailable, hiding possible attacks against the services. In order to explore the feasibility of the approach, we focused on a particular usage example: the network traffic analysis performed during the attack/defence Capture the Flag (CTF), a cybersecurity competition where different teams attempt to find vulnerabilities in services run by the opposing team, fix them and build exploits to perform attacks. It is worth noticing that such a scenario enabled us even to work in a protected context, avoiding producing attacks that can be exploited in a production environment. Accordingly, outlining that the state of the art shows a lack of results with respect to the proposed approach we performed a security assessment of the chosen tools and demonstrated the feasibility of the approach, concluding that these attack patterns should be taken into consideration when building a protection system.
攻击数据包分析器:Caronte案例研究
如今,采用网络流量分析工具来防范可能的网络攻击是很常见的,但是攻击者已经越来越熟练地构建越来越复杂的攻击,以避免IDS/IPS动作,通常是通过采用规避来隐藏对监控系统的攻击。在本文中,我们测试了一种构建攻击的创新想法,该想法依赖于对IDS/IPS的特定组件(数据包分析器)进行攻击的想法,以使其(至少暂时)不可用,隐藏针对服务的可能攻击。为了探索该方法的可行性,我们专注于一个特定的使用示例:在攻击/防御捕获旗帜(CTF)期间执行的网络流量分析,这是一场网络安全竞赛,不同的团队试图在对方团队运行的服务中找到漏洞,修复它们并构建漏洞来执行攻击。值得注意的是,这样的场景甚至使我们能够在受保护的上下文中工作,避免产生可以在生产环境中利用的攻击。因此,我们对所选工具进行了安全评估,并展示了该方法的可行性,并得出结论,在构建保护系统时应考虑到这些攻击模式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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