Incentive-Compatible Online Mechanisms for Resource Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds

2014 IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing Pub Date : 2014-06-27 DOI:10.1109/CLOUD.2014.50

Lena Mashayekhy, Mahyar Movahed Nejad, Daniel Grosu, A. Vasilakos

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引用次数: 41

Abstract

Cloud providers provision their various resources such as CPUs, memory, and storage in the form of Virtual Machine (VM) instances which are then allocated to the users. We design online mechanisms for VM provisioning and allocation in clouds that consider several types of available resources. Our proposed online mechanisms make no assumptions about future demand of VMs, which is the case in real cloud settings. The proposed mechanisms are invoked as soon as a user places a request or some of the allocated resources are released and become available. The mechanisms allocate VM instances to selected users for the period they are requested for, and ensure that the users will continue using their VM instances for the entire requested period. In addition, the mechanisms determine the payment the users have to pay for using the allocated resources. We prove that the mechanisms are incentive-compatible, that is, they give incentives to the users to reveal their true valuations for their requested bundles of VM instances. We investigate the performance of our proposed mechanisms through extensive experiments.

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云中资源供应和分配的激励兼容在线机制

云提供商以虚拟机(VM)实例的形式提供各种资源，如cpu、内存和存储，然后将其分配给用户。我们为云中的虚拟机提供和分配设计了在线机制，考虑了几种类型的可用资源。我们提出的在线机制没有对虚拟机的未来需求做任何假设，这是实际云环境中的情况。一旦用户发出请求或某些已分配的资源被释放并变得可用，就会调用提议的机制。该机制将虚拟机实例分配给所选用户，并确保用户在整个请求周期内继续使用其虚拟机实例。此外，这些机制还决定了用户为使用分配的资源而必须支付的费用。我们证明了这些机制是激励兼容的，也就是说，它们激励用户揭示他们对所请求的VM实例包的真实估值。我们通过广泛的实验来研究我们提出的机制的性能。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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2014 IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing

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