Hysteresis from Employer Subsidies

Emmanuel Saez, B. Schoefer, D. Seim
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引用次数: 21

Abstract

Abstract This paper uses administrative data to analyze a large and 8-year long employer payroll tax rate cut in Sweden for young workers aged 26 or less. We replicate previous results documenting that during the earlier years of the reform, it raised youth employment among the treated workers, driven by labor demand (as workers’ take-home wages did not respond). First, drawing on additional years of data, this paper then documents that the longer-run effects during the reform are twice as large as the medium-run effects. Second, we document novel labor-demand-driven “hysteresis” from this policy – i.e. persistent employment effects even after the subsidy no longer applies – along two dimensions. Over the lifecycle, employment effects persist even after workers age out of eligibility. Three years after the repeal, employment remains elevated at the maximal reform level in the formerly subsidized ages. These hysteresis effects more than double the direct employment effects of the reform. Discrimination against young workers in job posting fell during the reform and does not bounce back after repeal, potentially explaining our results.
雇主补贴的滞后效应
摘要本文利用行政数据分析了瑞典对26岁或以下的年轻工人进行的大规模和长达8年的雇主工资税率削减。我们复制了先前的结果,证明在改革的早期,在劳动力需求的推动下,它提高了受改革工人中的青年就业(因为工人的实得工资没有反应)。首先,利用额外年份的数据,本文证明了改革期间的长期影响是中期影响的两倍。其次,我们从两个维度记录了这一政策中新出现的劳动力需求驱动的“滞后效应”——即,即使在补贴不再适用之后,就业效应仍在持续。在整个生命周期中,就业效应即使在工人年龄超出资格范围后仍然存在。在废除后的三年里,就业率仍然保持在以前补贴年龄的最高改革水平。这些滞后效应是改革对就业的直接影响的两倍多。在改革期间,针对年轻工人的招聘歧视有所减少,并且在废除后没有反弹,这可能解释了我们的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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