{"title":"Serbia: Military Confrontation with NATO","authors":"Marinko Bobić","doi":"10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chapter six covers the military confrontation launched by the NATO alliance against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) in 1999. It explains why and under what conditions Slobodan Milošević’s regime rejected a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. It does so by highlighting how antagonisms in Kosovo presented a unique domestic crisis, giving Milošević an opportunity to seize power and ride on the popular sentiment, but also limited Milošević’s ability to compromise with Kosovo Albanians. To retain regime stability and popularity, Milošević resisted compromising on Kosovo. In addition, he was given foreign support by Russia, which opposed NATO intervention at a diplomatic level. Once the conditions change, a counter-factual analysis shows that so does their causal power, further strengthening the findings.","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"516 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Chapter six covers the military confrontation launched by the NATO alliance against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) in 1999. It explains why and under what conditions Slobodan Milošević’s regime rejected a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. It does so by highlighting how antagonisms in Kosovo presented a unique domestic crisis, giving Milošević an opportunity to seize power and ride on the popular sentiment, but also limited Milošević’s ability to compromise with Kosovo Albanians. To retain regime stability and popularity, Milošević resisted compromising on Kosovo. In addition, he was given foreign support by Russia, which opposed NATO intervention at a diplomatic level. Once the conditions change, a counter-factual analysis shows that so does their causal power, further strengthening the findings.