The Rule in Foss v Harbottle is Dead; Long Live the Rule in Foss v Harbottle

D. Kershaw
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

The proper plaintiff rule reflects the elemental legal principle that only the right-holder is entitled to enforce the right. At common law, as a corollary of this principle, only when the general meeting was incapable of acting in the corporate interest could a derivative action be brought. It followed from this principle that wrongdoer control of the shareholder meeting was a pre-requisite to derivative litigation. The Companies Act 2006 introduced what is considered to be a ‘new’ derivative action mechanism. Although the Act is silent about the wrongdoer control requirement, it is widely understood to have abolished it. Central to this understanding is the view that this is what Parliament intended, as supported by a view of the mischief of the Act and by several ministerial statements. However, careful attention to the extra-legislative record as well as to the rules on statutory interpretation render this view of the mischief of the Act inaccurate and these statements of ministerial intent inadmissible. Detaching our interpretation of the Act from reliance upon this record opens up unexpected possibilities when combined with observations from recent authority which suggest that the Act’s reforms were not intended to abolish the proper plaintiff principle. A compelling case can be made that wrongdoer control remains as a threshold condition to derivative litigation.
Foss诉Harbottle案规则失效Foss诉Harbottle案规则万岁
适当原告规则体现了只有权利人才有权行使权利的基本法律原则。在普通法上,作为这一原则的必然结果,只有当股东大会不能代表公司利益行事时,才能提起派生诉讼。根据这一原则,不法行为者控制股东大会是衍生诉讼的先决条件。《2006年公司法》引入了一种被认为是“新的”衍生诉讼机制。尽管该法案对违法者控制要求保持沉默,但人们普遍认为它已经废除了这一要求。这种理解的核心是这样一种观点,即这是议会的意图,并得到了对该法案的危害的看法和几份部长声明的支持。然而,仔细注意立法外的记录以及关于法律解释的规则,就会发现这种关于该法的危害的观点是不准确的,这些部长意图的陈述是不可接受的。将我们对该法的解释从对这一记录的依赖中分离出来,结合最近权威的观察,就会出现意想不到的可能性,这些观察表明该法的改革并非旨在废除适当的原告原则。可以提出一个令人信服的案例,即不法行为者控制仍然是衍生诉讼的门槛条件。
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