Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations

N. Gravin, Yaonan Jin, P. Lu, Chenhao Zhang
{"title":"Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations","authors":"N. Gravin, Yaonan Jin, P. Lu, Chenhao Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3328526.3329586","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we obtain the tight approximation guarantees for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of $2$, improving the previous best known result of $3$. Our bound is tight with respect to either the optimal offline benchmark or its fractional relaxation. We also present a simple deterministic mechanism with the tight approximation guarantee of $3$ against the fractional optimum, improving the best known result of $(\\sqrt2 + 2)$ against the weaker integral benchmark.","PeriodicalId":416173,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"15","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329586","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15

Abstract

In this paper, we obtain the tight approximation guarantees for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of $2$, improving the previous best known result of $3$. Our bound is tight with respect to either the optimal offline benchmark or its fractional relaxation. We also present a simple deterministic mechanism with the tight approximation guarantee of $3$ against the fractional optimum, improving the best known result of $(\sqrt2 + 2)$ against the weaker integral benchmark.
可加性估值的最优预算-可行机制
本文给出了具有可加购买者的预算可行机制的紧逼近保证。我们提出了一种新的简单随机机制,其近似比为$2$,改进了之前最著名的结果$3$。对于最优离线基准或者它的分数松弛,我们的界是紧的。我们还提出了一个简单的确定性机制,该机制对分数阶最优具有严格的近似保证,从而改进了对较弱积分基准的最已知结果$(\sqrt2 + 2)$。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信