Sadullah Canakci, Chathura Rajapaksha, Leila Delshadtehrani, A. Nataraja, Michael B. Taylor, Manuel Egele, Ajay Joshi
{"title":"ProcessorFuzz: Processor Fuzzing with Control and Status Registers Guidance","authors":"Sadullah Canakci, Chathura Rajapaksha, Leila Delshadtehrani, A. Nataraja, Michael B. Taylor, Manuel Egele, Ajay Joshi","doi":"10.1109/HOST55118.2023.10133714","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"As the complexity of modern processors has increased over the years, developing effective verification strategies to identify bugs prior to manufacturing has become critical. Inspired by software fuzzing, a technique commonly used for software testing, multiple recent works use hardware fuzzing for the verification of Register-Transfer Level (RTL) designs. However, these works suffer from several limitations such as lack of support for widelyused Hardware Description Languages (HDLs) and misleading coverage-signals that misidentify ‘‘interesting’’ inputs. Towards overcoming these shortcomings, we present ProcessorFuzz, a processor fuzzer that guides the fuzzer with a novel CSR-transition coverage metric. ProcessorFuzz monitors the transitions in Control and Status Registers (CSRs) as CSRs are in charge of controlling and holding the state of the processor. Therefore, transitions in CSRs indicate a new processor state, and guiding the fuzzer based on this feedback enables ProcessorFuzz to explore new processor states. We evaluated ProcessorFuzz with three real-world opensource processors — Rocket, BOOM, and BlackParrot. ProcessorFuzz triggered a set of ground-truth bugs $1.23 \\times$ faster (on average) than DIFUZZRTL. Moreover, our experiments exposed 8 new bugs across the three RISC-V cores and one new bug in a reference model. All nine bugs were confirmed by the developers of the corresponding projects.","PeriodicalId":128125,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST55118.2023.10133714","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
As the complexity of modern processors has increased over the years, developing effective verification strategies to identify bugs prior to manufacturing has become critical. Inspired by software fuzzing, a technique commonly used for software testing, multiple recent works use hardware fuzzing for the verification of Register-Transfer Level (RTL) designs. However, these works suffer from several limitations such as lack of support for widelyused Hardware Description Languages (HDLs) and misleading coverage-signals that misidentify ‘‘interesting’’ inputs. Towards overcoming these shortcomings, we present ProcessorFuzz, a processor fuzzer that guides the fuzzer with a novel CSR-transition coverage metric. ProcessorFuzz monitors the transitions in Control and Status Registers (CSRs) as CSRs are in charge of controlling and holding the state of the processor. Therefore, transitions in CSRs indicate a new processor state, and guiding the fuzzer based on this feedback enables ProcessorFuzz to explore new processor states. We evaluated ProcessorFuzz with three real-world opensource processors — Rocket, BOOM, and BlackParrot. ProcessorFuzz triggered a set of ground-truth bugs $1.23 \times$ faster (on average) than DIFUZZRTL. Moreover, our experiments exposed 8 new bugs across the three RISC-V cores and one new bug in a reference model. All nine bugs were confirmed by the developers of the corresponding projects.