Perceptual Differences in Approaches to Censorship: Information Intermediaries and the Implementation of Law

Inf. Soc. Pub Date : 1997-06-01 DOI:10.1080/019722497129205
M. Wilkinson
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Censorship exists wherever there is preselection of information made available to a particular group of potential users-that is, wherever there is an information intermediary between the information source and the user. Therefore, one cannot ask whether or not there should be censorship. Nor is it realistic to declare that freedom of expression should override censorship. A more useful approach is to ask what checks and balances should be in place to ensure freedom of expression and other basic information rights in the face of the necessity and reality of the information selection process. Two forms of legal intervention have been used to create our current regime. This article first examines delegation of the censoring/selecting power to particular intermediaries in the information cycle. Historically, power to select appropriate information for dissemination was delegated to the ''censors,'' and examples of this approach continue in our law in such areas as access and copyright legislation and in unlegislated areas of the law such as confidential information. Second, the paper examines situations where the law regulates the censoring activity itself. In situations such as libel and obscenity, for example, our law preempts the intermediary by dictating the decision itself. The law, however, does not necessarily mirror actual decisions being made by information intermediaries. Empirical evidence suggests that selection/censorship decisions, which the current law might have been expected to affect, may be being made by other intermediaries and on other criteria than theoretical examination of the law would lead one to expect. These ''extralegal'' forms of censorship can be very effective, but are we content to leave those decisions without legal control? The article concludes that more strategic empirical analysis of our current legal attempts to create effective checks and balances on the censoring decisions made by intermediaries will assist us in further law reform attempts.
审查方式的感知差异:信息中介与法律实施
只要有预先选择的信息提供给特定的潜在用户群体,即信息源和用户之间存在信息中介的地方,就存在审查。因此,人们不能问是否应该有审查制度。宣称言论自由应该凌驾于审查之上也不现实。一个更有用的方法是,在面对信息选择过程的必要性和现实时,应采取何种制衡措施,以确保言论自由和其他基本信息权利。两种形式的法律干预被用来建立我们目前的制度。本文首先考察了信息循环中审查/选择权力授予特定中介机构的情况。从历史上看,选择适当信息进行传播的权力被授予“审查者”,这种方法的例子在我们的法律中继续存在,如访问和版权立法领域以及法律的非立法领域,如机密信息。其次,本文考察了法律规范审查活动本身的情况。例如,在诽谤和淫秽等情况下,我们的法律通过规定决定本身来优先于中介。然而,法律并不一定反映信息中介所做的实际决定。经验证据表明,现行法律可能会影响的选择/审查决定可能是由其他中介机构根据其他标准作出的,而不是对法律的理论审查所导致的预期。这些“法外”的审查形式可能非常有效,但我们满足于让这些决定没有法律控制吗?本文的结论是,对我们目前的法律尝试进行更战略性的实证分析,以对中介机构做出的审查决定进行有效的制衡,将有助于我们进一步的法律改革尝试。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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