Effect of Cyberattack on Event Detection Algorithm in Distribution System using Synchrophasor Measurements

Abstract

Cyber-physical system (CPS) in the twenty-first century is paving new ways to have better connectivity among the power system devices, effective control, and improved reliability. Thus, manipulating this system by foreign interventions like false data injection (FDI) must be handled with utmost priority. Power system monitoring using micro phasor measurement units (μ PMUs) gives more insight into the transient performance of the system. Using the optimal placement of PMUs, minimum numbers of μ PMUs will ensure the complete observability of the power system. This comprehensive view of the system can be used to detect any event that occurs in the system. The measurements of μ PMUs connected to the end points of each radial line can be used to detect the event location. But, any FDI-type attack on these devices can degrade the result of the event detection algorithm. In this paper, we work on IEEE 33 bus system to find the effect of falsified μ PMU data on the event detection algorithm. This work presents attack detection using a tolerance limits violation in the presence of an attack. Further, attack effect mitigation on the μ PMU readings is inspected to find its detrimental effect on the detection algorithm. Finally, the manipulated μ PMUs are detected, and their readings are avoided to get the proper event location.