Towards Model Co-evolution Across Self-Adaptation Steps for Combined Safety and Security Analysis

Thomas E. F. Witte, Raffaela Groner, Alexander Raschke, Matthias Tichy, Irdin Pekaric, M. Felderer
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Self-adaptive systems offer several attack surfaces due to the communication via different channels and the different sensors required to observe the environment. Often, attacks cause safety to be compromised as well, making it necessary to consider these two aspects together. Furthermore, the approaches currently used for safety and security analysis do not sufficient take into account the intermediate steps of an adaptation. Current work in this area ignores the fact that a self-adaptive system also reveals possible vulnerabilities (even if only temporarily) during the adaptation. To address this issue, we propose a modeling approach that takes into account the different relevant aspects of a system, its adaptation process, as well as safety hazards and security attacks. We present several models that describe different aspects of a self-adaptive system and we outline our idea of how these models can then be combined into an Attack-Fault Tree. This allows modeling aspects of the system on different levels of abstraction and co-evolve the models using transformations according to the adaptation of the system. Finally, analyses can then be performed as usual on the resulting Attack-Fault Tree.CCS CONCEPTS• Software and its engineering → System description languages; Fault tree analysis; • Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-physical systems; Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks.
基于自适应步骤的组合安全分析模型协同进化研究
由于通过不同的通信通道和观察环境所需的不同传感器,自适应系统提供了多个攻击面。通常,攻击还会损害安全性,因此有必要同时考虑这两个方面。此外,目前用于安全和保障分析的方法没有充分考虑到适应的中间步骤。目前在这一领域的工作忽略了一个事实,即自适应系统在适应过程中也会暴露出可能的脆弱性(即使只是暂时的)。为了解决这个问题,我们提出了一种建模方法,该方法考虑了系统的不同相关方面、其适应过程以及安全隐患和安全攻击。我们提出了几个描述自适应系统不同方面的模型,并概述了如何将这些模型组合成攻击-故障树的想法。这允许在不同的抽象层次上对系统的各个方面进行建模,并根据系统的适应性使用转换来共同发展模型。最后,可以像往常一样对生成的攻击-故障树执行分析。•软件及其工程→系统描述语言;故障树分析;•计算机系统组织→嵌入式和网络物理系统;可靠和容错的系统和网络。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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