Do Australian Institutional Investors Aim to Influence the Human Resource Practices of Investee Companies?

Kirsten A. Anderson, S. Marshall, I. Ramsay
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

There has been considerable speculation regarding the effects of the growing prevalence of institutional investors in the equity markets on investee company behaviour. It has been posited that the growth of institutional investors may lead to the pursuit of what is generally referred to in the human resource literature as 'high commitment' employment practices in investee companies. This may be because institutional investors are using 'voice' mechanisms to pressure investee companies to adopt 'high commitment' human resource practices. These labour management practices typically involve managerial attempts to motivate and manage workers through a series of workplace practices that incorporate the interests of employees rather than through strict command and control structures. These might include investment in staff training and development, employment security, flexible workplace practices and self-directed work teams, investment in occupational health and safety, incentive pay, and 'partnerships' and consultation with employees and/or their representatives. The purpose of this study is to discover whether it is the intention of institutional investors to encourage investee companies to adopt 'high commitment' employment practices through case studies of twelve prominent institutional investors with funds invested in the Australian equities market and the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors (an industry body representing 39 superannuation funds). In the event that the institutional investor did seek to influence investee companies, we asked (i) why they seek to influence the companies, and (ii) what mechanisms they use to exert this influence. In the event that they did not seek to influence investee companies in this way, we asked (iii) why they did not and what barriers exist to taking into account companies' employment practices. We also sought to discover (iv) whether institutional investors take into account the employment practices of companies when making investment decisions, and if so, (v) what kinds of practices they take into account. In addition, we enquired into (vi) whether there are any differences between institutional investors, based on type, in relation to whether or not they have an intention to influence investee company employment practices, or the ability to do so. We are particularly interested in the difference between industry superannuation funds and other types of institutional investors. This difference is significant, first, because under the relevant legislation, industry superannuation funds are required to have equal representation of employers and members on their boards. In the case of industry superannuation funds, which are operated by parties to industrial awards, these representatives are usually employer associations and unions. Second, industry superannuation funds often manage their funds via external fund managers, whereas other institutional investors generally manage their funds internally. It is possible that these two characteristics of industry superannuation funds might result in different attitudes and responses concerning the human resource practices of investee companies compared with other types of institutional investors.
澳大利亚机构投资者的目标是影响被投资公司的人力资源实践吗?
关于机构投资者在股票市场日益盛行对被投资公司行为的影响,一直存在着相当多的猜测。有人认为,机构投资者的增长可能会导致被投资公司追求人力资源文献中通常提到的“高承诺”雇佣实践。这可能是因为机构投资者正在利用“声音”机制向被投资公司施压,要求其采用“高承诺”的人力资源实践。这些劳动管理做法通常涉及管理层试图通过一系列结合雇员利益的工作场所做法而不是通过严格的命令和控制结构来激励和管理工人。这些投资可能包括对员工培训和发展、就业保障、灵活的工作场所做法和自我指导的工作团队、对职业健康和安全的投资、激励性薪酬以及与员工和/或其代表的"伙伴关系"和协商。本研究的目的是发现机构投资者是否有意鼓励被投资公司采用“高承诺”雇佣实践,通过对12家知名机构投资者的案例研究,这些机构投资者的基金投资于澳大利亚股票市场和澳大利亚养老金投资者委员会(一个代表39家养老金基金的行业机构)。如果机构投资者确实试图影响被投资公司,我们询问(i)他们为什么试图影响公司,以及(ii)他们使用什么机制来施加这种影响。如果他们没有试图以这种方式影响被投资公司,我们询问(iii)他们为什么不这样做,以及在考虑公司的雇佣做法方面存在哪些障碍。我们还试图发现(iv)机构投资者在做出投资决策时是否考虑到公司的雇佣实践,如果是,(v)他们考虑了哪些类型的实践。此外,我们调查了(vi)机构投资者之间是否存在差异,基于类型,他们是否有意图影响被投资公司的雇佣实践,或者有能力这样做。我们对行业养老基金与其他类型机构投资者之间的差异特别感兴趣。这种差异是显著的,首先,因为根据相关立法,行业养老基金必须在董事会中拥有雇主和成员的平等代表权。就行业养老基金而言,这些代表通常是雇主协会和工会,这些基金是由行业奖项的各方运营的。其次,行业养老基金通常通过外部基金经理管理其资金,而其他机构投资者通常在内部管理其资金。行业养老基金的这两个特点可能会导致其对被投资公司人力资源实践的态度和反应与其他类型的机构投资者不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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