Transaction Cost Regulation after Expropriation: Argentina's Public Utility Sector

Andrés Chambouleyron
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Abstract

With the passing of the Economic Emergency Act in January 2002 which froze all public utility rates and simultaneously devalued the local currency, Argentina entered a period of systematic breaches of the guarantees granted by the government to public utility investors in the early nineties. Such guarantees provided safeguards that managed to substantially reduce expropriation risk in the sector by lowering investors’ cost of capital, thus encouraging foreign capital inflows. The implementation of the Emergency Act in the country also marked the beginning of a period in which rule-based regulation of public utilities was replaced by a mechanism based on government discretion. This paper looks into the governance structure used by the government for the sector in the early nineties when the privatization process was designed and launched, and suggests what that governance structure should be today, more than a decade after the beginning of the contract breaches. Defining governance as the institutional and contractual framework within which public services are provided, the paper concludes that after a decade of systematic contract breaches and expropriations, neither the bilateral governance (i.e., government as regulator with a vertically integrated private company providing the service) adopted by the country in the early nineties nor the one that would be recommended by Williamson's taxonomy (i.e., state-owned vertically integrated companies) would be appropriate, at least in the short- and medium-term. Given that the guarantees provided to investors at the beginning of the nineties failed to prevent the contract violations, a structure that seeks to minimize the risk of a future expropriation should be based on a more market-oriented type of governance, without additional guarantees to investors. The proposed governance structure involves vertically separated companies with the current public utilities acting as OpCos, with network maintenance and commercial obligations only and without the responsibility of network expansions, a task that would be conducted by NetCos under the structure of public-private partnerships (PPP) or Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) created for this exclusive purpose.
征收后的交易成本管制:阿根廷公用事业部门
随着2002年1月《经济紧急状态法》的通过,冻结了所有公用事业费率,同时使当地货币贬值,阿根廷进入了一个有系统地违反政府在90年代初向公用事业投资者提供担保的时期。这种担保提供了保障措施,通过降低投资者的资本成本,从而鼓励外国资本流入,大大降低了该部门的征用风险。《紧急状态法》在该国的实施也标志着一个时期的开始,在这个时期,基于规则的公用事业管理被基于政府自由裁量权的机制所取代。本文研究了在私有化进程设计和启动的90年代初,政府对该部门使用的治理结构,并提出了在合同违约开始十多年后的今天,该治理结构应该是什么。本文将治理定义为提供公共服务的制度和契约框架,并得出结论认为,经过十年的系统性合同违约和征用,该国在90年代初采用的双边治理(即政府作为监管者,由垂直整合的私营公司提供服务)和威廉姆森分类法所推荐的治理(即,至少在短期和中期,国有垂直整合企业是合适的。鉴于九十年代初向投资者提供的保证未能防止违反合同的行为,寻求将未来征用风险降至最低的结构应以更以市场为导向的治理类型为基础,而不向投资者提供额外的保证。拟议的治理结构涉及垂直分离的公司,目前的公用事业公司作为运营公司,只承担网络维护和商业义务,不承担网络扩展的责任,网络扩展的任务将由网络公司在公私合作伙伴关系(PPP)或为此专门目的创建的特殊目的载体(SPV)的结构下进行。
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