What happens to old modes of cognition when new ones are introduced during trance and other transitions?

Abstract

Chapter 5 examines the intense queries of the masters about whether previous modes of cognition remain when a new one is introduced, when entering trance, or during less dramatic transitions, such as learning a proof for what was formerly only believed. It explores the varying solutions proposed to this problem in which Aristotle’s model of knowledge and dependent sciences was employed. The chapter refines the earlier conclusion about the perception of the self implied in the discussions of a person's ability to hold to two different, contradicting, habitus (pl.) and interprets it against two challenges university theologians faced: professional scholars’ need to distinguish themselves from simple believers and the need to hold to the ideal of simplicity in the face of sophistication, that is, to be simultaneously simple and learned. This difficult reconciliation and its implications for the perception of a man's social performance are then shown to have been particularly relevant to the conflicts over learning and simplicity among the Franciscans of the first and second generations.