Trust, the "wisdom of crowds", and societal norms: the creation, maintenance, and reasoning about trust in peer networks

Abstract

In a peer network environment, which is typical in ad-hoc wireless networks, nodes collaborate to achieve some collective end. There is no hierarchy within the network, all nodes being given equal authority. No channel to nodes outside of the peer network is assumed to exist. In this untraditional environment we must provide traditional security properties and assure fairness in order to enable the secure, collaborative success of the network. One solution is to form a Trusted Domain, and exclude perceived dishonest and unfair members. Such solutions have previously been intolerant of masquerading, and have suffered from a lack of precise control over the allocation and exercise of privileges within the Trusted Domain. We introduce a model based on the work of Yang et. al. 2002 and Narasimha et. al. 2003 that provides granular control over privileges, and guards against masquerading. Continued good behavior is rewarded by an escalation of privileges, while requiring an increased commitment of resources. Bad behavior results in expulsion from the Trusted Domain. In colluding with malicious nodes, well behaved nodes risk losing privileges gained over time; collusion is thereby discouraged.