From “Paradigm” to “Disciplinary Matrix”: A Fatal Step

Nataliya I. Kuznetsova
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Abstract

The citation index of Thomas Kuhn’s work may strike any imagination. “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (first edition 1962) is undoubtedly a twentieth-century record-breaker in the field of philosophy of science in terms of such a scientometric parameter. But such fame has been bitter in many ways and placed a heavy burden on the author. For several decades he has been the target of the harshest and most severe criticism. Often the concept of “normal science” and the “scientific revolution” as a “Gestalt switch” was declared ridiculous and absurd. The paper analyses three lines of criticism of Kuhn’s concept: the first came from practicing scientists, the second from specialists in the philosophy of science (primarily proponents of “critical rationalism”), and the third from the field of social epistemology. Reproaches about the political bias of Kuhn’s concept were taken to extremes, since his views were widely popular. In our opinion, Kuhn should be called a victim of spontaneous hypercriticism. This circumstance did not allow him to improve the original model of scientific revolutions. In this respect, replacing the concept of “paradigm” with the concept of “disciplinary matrix” was a step backwards, not forwards. However, it is impossible to deny that in the field of the historiography of science, he acted as a real reformer. With the courage of Don Quixote, he defended the rights of historical reconstruction, the preservation of the historical past of science, which should not be completely assimilated within the framework of the modern system of knowledge. His motto was – “penetrate the minds of other people who lived in the past.” He boldly argued that in the process of historical development, science changes not only ideas about the object of knowledge (representations of the object), but also the reference of its ideas and concepts. Such a formulation of the question has not yet been fully reflected in modern epistemological concepts.
从“范式”到“学科矩阵”:致命的一步
托马斯·库恩著作的引文索引可能会出乎任何人的想象。《科学革命的结构》(1962年第一版)就科学计量参数而言,无疑是20世纪科学哲学领域的破纪录之作。但这样的名声在很多方面都是痛苦的,给作者带来了沉重的负担。几十年来,他一直是最严厉和最严厉批评的目标。通常,“常规科学”和“科学革命”的概念被认为是“格式塔开关”,是荒谬和荒谬的。本文分析了对库恩概念的三种批评:第一种来自实践科学家,第二种来自科学哲学专家(主要是“批判理性主义”的支持者),第三种来自社会认识论领域。由于库恩的观点广受欢迎,对他的政治偏见的指责被推向了极端。在我们看来,库恩应该被称为自发的过度批评的受害者。这种情况不允许他改进最初的科学革命模型。在这方面,用“学科矩阵”的概念取代“范式”的概念是一种倒退,而不是进步。然而,不可否认的是,在科学史学领域,他是一个真正的改革者。以堂吉诃德的勇气,他捍卫了重建历史的权利,捍卫了保存科学的历史,不应该完全被现代知识体系的框架所同化。他的座右铭是“洞悉生活在过去的人们的思想”。他大胆地认为,在历史发展的过程中,科学不仅改变了关于知识对象的观念(对象的表征),而且改变了其思想和概念的参照。这种问题的提法尚未充分反映在现代认识论概念中。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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