How to filter out random clickers in a crowdsourcing-based study?

Sung-Hee Kim, Hyokun Yun, Ji Soo Yi
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引用次数: 28

Abstract

Crowdsourcing-based user studies have become increasingly popular in information visualization (InfoVis) and visual analytics (VA). However, it is still unclear how to deal with some undesired crowdsourcing workers, especially those who submit random responses simply to gain wages (random clickers, henceforth). In order to mitigate the impacts of random clickers, several studies simply exclude outliers, but this approach has a potential risk of losing data from participants whose performances are extreme even though they participated faithfully. In this paper, we evaluated the degree of randomness in responses from a crowdsourcing worker to infer whether the worker is a random clicker. Thus, we could reliably filter out random clickers and found that resulting data from crowdsourcing-based user studies were comparable with those of a controlled lab study. We also tested three representative reward schemes (piece-rate, quota, and punishment schemes) with four different levels of compensations ($0.00, $0.20, $1.00, and $4.00) on a crowdsourcing platform with a total of 1,500 crowdsourcing workers to investigate the influences that different payment conditions have on the number of random clickers. The results show that higher compensations decrease the proportion of random clickers, but such increase in participation quality cannot justify the associated additional costs. A detailed discussion on how to optimize the payment scheme and amount to obtain high-quality data economically is provided.
如何在基于众包的研究中过滤掉随机点击者?
基于众包的用户研究在信息可视化(InfoVis)和可视化分析(VA)中越来越流行。然而,目前仍不清楚如何处理一些不受欢迎的众包工人,特别是那些只是为了获得工资而随机提交回复的人(从今以后,随机点击者)。为了减轻随机点击者的影响,一些研究简单地排除了异常值,但这种方法有可能丢失那些表现极端的参与者的数据,即使他们忠实地参与了。在本文中,我们评估了来自众包工人的回答的随机性程度,以推断该工人是否是随机点击者。因此,我们可以可靠地过滤掉随机点击者,并发现基于众包的用户研究的结果数据与受控实验室研究的数据相当。我们还在一个共有1500名众包工人的众包平台上测试了三种具有代表性的奖励方案(计件率、配额和惩罚方案)和四种不同水平的补偿(0.00美元、0.20美元、1.00美元和4.00美元),以调查不同支付条件对随机点击者数量的影响。结果表明,较高的报酬降低了随机点击者的比例,但这种参与质量的提高并不能证明相关的额外成本是合理的。详细讨论了如何优化支付方案和金额,以经济地获得高质量的数据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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