The Orienting Reaction: Key to Brain Re-presentational Mechanisms

Abstract

Psychology as a science has shown several seemingly incompatible fa,:~s. In the beginning psychology was defined in terms of intentionality: the ability'3f people to discern the difference between inte.nt and act and between perceiver arid what is perceived (Brentano, 1967). The, problems addressed by psychology were thought (e.g., Kiilpe, 1893) and feeling (e.g., Wundt, 1874, Freud, 1954), . sensation and movement were explored by physiologists (e.g., Mach, 1914; and Helmholtz, 1867). But soon it became clear that the boundaries between sensation and perception arid be~ween movement and action could not be ,so sharply delineated. Even feeiing~:lhad their physiological roots in the instincts (Woodworth, 1940). Thus~;j'psychology became physiological either overtly (Pavlov, 1927; Wundt; 1874) or covertly (Freud, 1950; Pribram & Gill, 1976). A new departure was signaled by Watson (1919) when, in the tradition of a growing positivism, he declared that psychology must be rooted in observation and that what could be obseryed was the behavior of organisms. Watson himself remained oriented to physiology as did his eminent student Karl Lashley. But in the hands of others-Tolman (1932), Hull (1951), Spence (1956), and, more explicitly, Skinner (1938)-psyc!1010gy as a strictly behavioral science flowered. The older views continued to develop, however. Psychophysics~(e.g.; Fechner, 1860; Stevens, 1975; Werner & Mountcastle, 1965; De Valois, 1960; De Valois, Albrecht, & Thorell, in press) honed the relationship between introspection, physical specification, and physiological inquiry to a fine edge. Gestalt psychology (e:g., Kohler, 1964) also followed this tradition, using the data from illusions as anchors for theoretical construction.