Bytes, With, and Through: Establishment of Cyber Engagement Teams to Enable Collective Security

W. R. Smith
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Abstract

Multiple documents from the White House, Congress, and from within the Department of Defense describe the imperative to work with allies and partners toward long-term advancement of the U.S. and partners’ interests. These same documents also often stress the importance of the cyberspace as a warfighting domain and a U.S. and international interest. However, there is no clear strategy or methodology today that explicitly links the building of partner capacity within the cyber domain. This paper serves as a primer for discussion on how to bridge cyber operations and partner capacity by proposing a concept of Cyber Engagement Teams (CETs). CETs would seeks to expand on current Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA) or other cooperation and engagement apparatuses. Taking advantage of similar successes and lessons learned over the many decades by those units engaging in FID, SFA, and other security cooperation mechanisms, the U.S. has an opportunity establish a cadre of functional cyber experts to complement the traditional and existing engagement models. These forward deployed CETs would work with and train U.S. allies in areas of network operations, cyber security, and even offensive cyber operations while at the same time providing a viable mechanism to hold the adversary’s target networks and systems at risk. By working with indigenous forces, CETs would situate U.S. and friendly forces and capabilities in a better position to counter Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) threats, to hold adversary command and control (C2) networks at risk by working “by, with, and through” friendly nations, and would develop lasting relationships. CETs are a logical tool to contend with cyber adversaries through friendly engagement, collective security, and partnering.
字节,有和通过:建立网络接触小组以实现集体安全
来自白宫、国会和国防部内部的多份文件描述了与盟友和合作伙伴合作以实现美国和合作伙伴利益长期发展的必要性。这些文件还经常强调网络空间作为作战领域以及美国和国际利益的重要性。然而,目前还没有明确的战略或方法将网络领域内的合作伙伴能力建设明确地联系起来。本文通过提出网络参与团队(cet)的概念,为讨论如何在网络运营和合作伙伴能力之间建立桥梁提供了基础。CETs将寻求扩大现有的对外内部防御(FID),安全部队援助(SFA)或其他合作和参与机制。利用这些参与FID、SFA和其他安全合作机制的单位几十年来取得的类似成功和经验教训,美国有机会建立一支功能性网络专家骨干队伍,以补充传统和现有的接触模式。这些前沿部署的cet将在网络作战、网络安全甚至进攻性网络作战领域与美国盟友合作并对其进行培训,同时提供一种可行的机制,使对手的目标网络和系统处于危险之中。通过与本土部队合作,CETs将使美国和友军部队和能力处于更好的位置,以应对反介入区域拒止(A2AD)威胁,通过“通过、与、并通过”友好国家合作,使对手的指挥和控制(C2)网络处于危险之中,并将发展持久的关系。通过友好接触、集体安全和伙伴关系,cet是对抗网络对手的合理工具。
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