Joint Response to the House Judiciary Committee on the State of Antitrust Law and Implications for Protecting Competition in Digital Markets

J. Baker, Joseph Farrell, Andrew I. Gavil, M. Gaynor, Michael Kades, M. Katz, Gene Kimmelman, A. Melamed, N. Rose, S. Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, C. Shapiro
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Economic research establishes that market power is now a serious problem. Growing market power harms consumers and workers, slows innovation, and limits productivity growth. Market power is on the rise in a number of major industries, including, for example, airlines, brewing, and hospitals, where multiple horizontal mergers that were allowed to proceed without antitrust challenge have markedly increased concentration in important markets and facilitated the exercise of market power. Exclusionary conduct by dominant companies that stifles competition from actual and potential rivals — including nascent rivals with capabilities for challenging a dominant firm’s market power and firms with competing R&D efforts — impairs what is often the most important economic force creating competitive pressure for dominant firms. This concern exists in digital marketplaces. Platforms are often insulated from platform competition to a substantial extent by substantial scale economies in supply and demand (network effects) combined with customer switching costs. Courts have contributed to increased monopoly power through decisions that have weakened the prohibitions against anticompetitive exclusionary conduct and anticompetitive mergers. The antitrust laws, as interpreted and enforced today, are inadequate to confront and deter growing market power in the U.S. economy and unnecessarily limit the ability of antitrust enforcers to address anticompetitive conduct. Many key antitrust precedents — particularly those precedents governing exclusionary conduct — rely on unsound economic theories or unsupported empirical claims about the competitive effects of certain practices. In part for this reason, the antitrust rules constructed by the courts reflect a systematically skewed error cost balance: they are too concerned to avoid both chilling procompetitive conduct and the high costs of litigation, and too dismissive of the costs of failing to deter harmful conduct. Excessively permissive precedents and unsound or unsupported economic claims have, in turn, encouraged overly cautious enforcement policies and overly demanding proof requirements and have discouraged government enforcers and private plaintiffs from bringing meritorious exclusionary conduct cases. The statement discusses a number of legal rules that are unsupported by or inconsistent with sound economic research that have contributed to overly permissive rules. The signatories to this letter strongly believe that antitrust enforcement has become too lax, in large part because of the courts and that Congress must act to correct this problem. The statement suggests a number of reforms could be considered. We do not collectively or unanimously endorse any of these, though some of us have done so in other contexts. We do believe that Congress has a historic opportunity to identify adverse trends in judicial interpretation of the antitrust and correct problems—not just by overriding damaging precedents, but also by reshaping the antitrust laws more broadly to enhance deterrence of anticompetitive conduct.
对众议院司法委员会关于反托拉斯法现状及其对保护数字市场竞争的影响的联合回应
经济研究表明,市场力量现在是一个严重的问题。不断增长的市场力量伤害了消费者和工人,减缓了创新,限制了生产率的增长。市场力量在一些主要行业中呈上升趋势,例如,航空公司、酿酒业和医院,在这些行业中,多次横向合并被允许在没有反垄断挑战的情况下进行,这显著提高了重要市场的集中度,并促进了市场力量的行使。占主导地位的公司的排他性行为扼杀了来自实际和潜在竞争对手的竞争——包括有能力挑战占主导地位的公司的市场力量的新兴竞争对手和具有竞争研发努力的公司——损害了通常是最重要的经济力量,为占主导地位的公司创造竞争压力。这种担忧存在于数字市场。在很大程度上,由于供需(网络效应)和客户转换成本的巨大规模经济,平台通常与平台竞争隔绝。法院通过削弱对反竞争排他性行为和反竞争合并的禁令的决定,助长了垄断力量的增加。按照今天的解释和执行,反垄断法不足以对抗和遏制美国经济中日益增长的市场力量,并且不必要地限制了反垄断执法者处理反竞争行为的能力。许多关键的反垄断先例——尤其是那些管理排他性行为的先例——依赖于不健全的经济理论或关于某些做法对竞争影响的不受支持的经验主义主张。部分出于这个原因,法院制定的反垄断规则反映了系统性的错误成本平衡:他们过于关注避免令人心寒的有利于竞争的行为和高昂的诉讼成本,并且对未能阻止有害行为的成本过于轻视。过度纵容的判例和不合理或不受支持的经济索赔反过来又鼓励了过于谨慎的执法政策和过于苛刻的举证要求,并阻碍了政府执法人员和私人原告提起有价值的排他行为案件。该声明讨论了一些没有得到可靠的经济研究支持或与之不一致的法律规则,这些规则导致了过度宽松的规则。这封信的签署人强烈认为,反垄断执法已经变得过于松懈,这在很大程度上是因为法院和国会必须采取行动纠正这个问题。该声明表明,可以考虑进行一系列改革。我们并非集体或一致赞同其中任何一项,尽管我们中的一些人在其他情况下这样做了。我们确实相信国会有一个历史性的机会来识别反托拉斯司法解释中的不利趋势,并纠正问题——不仅要推翻破坏性的先例,还要更广泛地重塑反托拉斯法,以加强对反竞争行为的威慑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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