The Dark Side of Rapport: Agent Misbehavior Face-to-Face and Online

Sandy D. Jap, Diana C. Robertson, Ryan Hamilton
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引用次数: 49

Abstract

A considerable body of research has extolled the virtues of establishing rapport in negotiations. Negotiators who are high in rapport tend to be more likely to reach an agreement and more satisfied with the outcome. Although rapport generally has been found to have positive effects in standard negotiation settings, we investigate the effects of rapport in impasse settings, where conflict between negotiators' core needs means that a successful deal can only be reached when one or both parties acts unethically or “misbehaves,” for example, by lying to the negotiation partner. In a series of three experiments, we find that negotiators who have a high level of rapport are more likely to behave unethically than are negotiators who have a low level of rapport. We find this effect holds both when high rapport results from the way in which negotiations are conducted (face-to-face versus computer mediated) and also when rapport is established through a brief rapport-building exercise before negotiations begin. Finally, we find that the negative effects (unethical behavior)---but not the positive effects (satisfaction with the negotiation, trust, and willingness to work in the future with the negotiation partner)---of high rapport are reduced when negotiators are given a simple reminder before negotiations begin that one's actions can have long-term repercussions for one's reputation. Taken together, this research supports the idea that, despite its several advantages, in certain situations rapport has a dark side, of which negotiators must be wary. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors.
融洽关系的阴暗面:代理的不当行为面对面和在线
相当多的研究赞扬了在谈判中建立融洽关系的优点。关系融洽的谈判者更有可能达成协议,对结果也更满意。尽管融洽关系通常在标准谈判环境中被发现具有积极影响,但我们研究了在僵局环境中融洽关系的影响,在僵局环境中,谈判者的核心需求之间的冲突意味着只有当一方或双方采取不道德行为或“不当行为”(例如,对谈判伙伴撒谎)时,才能达成成功的交易。在一系列的三个实验中,我们发现,与关系较差的谈判者相比,关系较好的谈判者更有可能做出不道德的行为。我们发现,当谈判的方式(面对面与电脑调解)产生高融洽关系时,以及通过谈判开始前短暂的建立融洽关系的练习建立融洽关系时,这种效应都成立。最后,我们发现,如果谈判者在谈判开始前得到一个简单的提醒,即他的行为会对他的声誉产生长期影响,那么高度融洽的负面影响(不道德的行为)——而不是积极影响(对谈判的满意度、信任和未来与谈判伙伴合作的意愿)——就会减少。综上所述,这项研究支持了这样一种观点,即尽管融洽关系有诸多优势,但在某些情况下也有其阴暗面,谈判者必须对此保持警惕。这篇论文被特刊编辑Pradeep Chintagunta和Preyas Desai接受。这篇论文被特刊编辑Pradeep Chintagunta和Preyas Desai接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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