Legal Deterrent Strategy Against Illegal Management Actions

S. Lutsenko, И ЛуценкоС
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The author considers legal strategy of restriction from illegal actions of the management, allowing to protect interests of shareholders. The author analyzes the agency problem between shareholders and management in the corporate legislation through a prism of legal strategy. The shareholder of the company possesses powers which allow it with a view of efficiency achievement as independently, and under the responsibility to appoint to (choose) the management. The management is allocated with large powers. Legal strategy of restraint assumes co-ordination of actions of management and the shareholder, allowing to lower the agency costs connected with wrongful acts (infringements of the fiduciary duties) from management. In the corporate legislation main principle is the priority of interests of the company in whole (the corporate blessing) over interests of other participants of corporate relations. The key role is played by the control of the shareholder of actions of management within the limits of legal strategy of restraint. The effective and flexible system of compensation allows to lower level of the agency conflict between management and the shareholder of the company. The motivation program should be focused on important long-term objectives of the company. Compensation directly is connected with results of activity of the company and professionalism of its management. A part of legal strategy of restraint is use of fiduciary rates which protect interests of the shareholder as a class. The legislation demands, that the management acted in good fair and reasonably in interests of the company. The author focuses the companies on provision of independence as a part of controls for the purpose of decrease in the agency conflict between management and participants of the company. The legal strategy of restraint offered by the author, allows to soften the agency conflict between interests of a management and interests of participants of the company.
对违法经营行为的法律威慑策略
作者考虑了 限制 管理层违法行为的法律策略,以 保护 股东的利益。本文通过 法律策略的 棱镜,分析了 公司立法中股东与管理层之间的代理问题。公司 的股东拥有权力,允许其 以 的观点( 的效率成就)独立为 ,并负有 任命(选择) 管理层的责任。管理层被分配了很大的权力 。 约束的法律策略是对 管理层和股东的 行为进行协调,从而降低 与管理层的不法行为(违反 信托责任)相关的代理成本。在公司立法中,主要原则是  公司在 整体上的利益优先于 其他 公司关系参与者的利益。关键作用在于 的控制权 , 股东的行为 管理层在 约束的法律策略范围内起到 的作用。有效而灵活的 薪酬制度使得 降低了 公司管理层与 股东之间的代理冲突水平。激励计划应该 专注于 公司的 重要的长期目标。薪酬直接 与 公司的 活动成果和 管理人员的专业水平挂钩。 约束的 法律策略的一部分是 使用 信托费率,将 股东的利益保护为 A 类。立法要求管理层为维护 公司的 利益,采取 良好、公平、合理的行为。作者将公司重点放在 提供 独立性,因为 是 控制的 部分,目的是 减少 公司管理层与 公司参与者之间的代理冲突。作者提出的 约束的法律策略,允许 缓和 a 管理层与 公司 参与人利益之间的代理冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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